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ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON LIQUIDITY ENDOGENEITY AND EFFECTS OF POLITICAL 
CONNECTIONS 
by 
Chengcheng Li 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018 
Under the Supervision of Professors Valeriy Sibilkov and Donghyun Kim 
 
The two essays in my dissertation explore separately the issues related to stock market liquidity 
and corporate financial distress. My first essay examines the effects of widespread liquidity 
demand on the stock liquidity. My second essay explores the effect of political connections on 
the corporate financial distress.  
In the first essay, I explore several questions related to the effect of liquidity demand on the 
individual stock liquidity level. I find that domestic actively managed equity funds in general 
hold less liquidity than their corresponding benchmarks. This leads them to rely more on the 
small fraction of liquid assets for immediacy when faced with financial distress and significant 
outflows. I further find that mutual funds sell more of liquid stocks when they are faced with 
negative fund flows. Consistent with prior literature that funds have to meet redemptions and 
reduce price impact, their engagement in liquid stock sale is more severe when the market 
volatility is high and when the aggregate market flow is low. Consequently, a widespread 
liquidity shock would be more likely to exert pressure on the liquidity of the stocks they sell.  
Using the mutual fund involuntary sale to proxy for the exogenous widespread liquidity demand, 
I find that a stock with a greater level of mutual fund forced sale tends to be less liquid in the 
 
 
iii 
 
next period. This liquidity erosion exists mostly among liquid stocks. I further find that the 
liquidity demand deteriorates liquid stocks' liquidity even more during volatile periods, when 
more funds face outflows and are forced to sell. The liquidity deterioration is also followed by 
return reversals in the subsequent quarter as the compensation for investors to provide liquidity, 
especially for liquid stocks and during bad market times. My overall evidence provides empirical 
evidence of the endogenous effect of liquidity demand on the stock liquidity and helps to at least 
partially explain the market liquidity spiral during turmoil periods by showing that liquid assets 
worsen in liquidity due to the market wide liquidity demand. One lesson to learn is that the 
market is far from resilient to absorb the liquidity demand.  
In the second essay, I propose and test several hypotheses to examine the impact of politically 
connected debtors on the resolution of distress. The results suggest that firms with politically 
connected debtors are more likely to exit the Chapter 11 process as a going-concern rather than 
through acquisition or liquidation. Additionally, I find that firms with politically connected 
debtors are less likely to undergo a subsequent distressed restructuring following emergence 
from Chapter 11. The findings suggest that the effects of debtors' political connections on 
bankruptcy outcomes are most likely due to the economic benefits associated with political 
connections rather than the potential for debtors to use political capital to coerce creditors into 
approving suboptimal continuations of unprofitable firms. Further, my findings indicate that 
firms with politically connected debtors are able to effectively reduce their financial leverage to 
the industry level after getting out of bankruptcy, while leverage ratios in firms without 
politically connected debtors remain above industry levels. Further evidence shows that creditors 
of firms with politically connected debtors are more willing to take equity in exchange for their 
debt claims. This result is indicative of investors' greater confidence in the firm's viability due to 
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implicit guarantees linked to debtors' political connections. Overall, the study provides evidence 
that politically connected debtors may improve the debtors' bargaining power, thereby resulting 
in a higher incidence of out-of-court restructurings.   
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Chapter 1
Liquidity Dry-ups in Equity Markets
1.1 Introduction
Liquidity has become important considerations for mutual fund investment decisions. Sev-
eral recent studies, such as Ben-Rephael (2014), Huang (2015) and Rzeznik (2016), show
that fund managers are actively involved in liquidity management in their overall portfolio
management decisions. Specifically, they show that fund managers adjust their portfolio to
more liquid stocks during volatile periods, when funds are more likely to experience outflows.
Presumably, the highly liquid stocks can better serve the purpose of liquidity provision for
fund managers – these stocks can be sold more quickly and with less adverse price impacts
than other stocks when mutual funds face liquidity demand.
However, the common preference for liquid stocks and the liquidity-driven sales of the
liquid stocks by mutual funds can result in a “crowding” effect. When mutual funds experi-
ence fund outflows, fund managers typically sell part of their holdings to cover redemptions.
If funds with similar liquid assets simultaneously experience outflows and choose to sell the
liquid stocks at the same time, the concentrated selling of these stocks can have significant
effects on their liquidity and price. During market turmoil when fund outflows are both
systemic and massive, the common liquidity demand of the mutual funds could result in
lower liquidity of the highly liquid stocks or liquidity dry-up in the equity market.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically study how investor demand for liquidity
endogenously affects stock liquidity in the equity market. Using mutual fund holdings and
transactions, we show that mutual funds exhibit strong preference for liquid stocks as means
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of liquidity provision in portfolio decisions. We study the effects of the liquidity-driven
trades based on mutual fund trading activities in association with fund flows.1 Mutual
funds tend to sell the more liquid stocks in their holdings when experiencing outflows. The
concentrated selling of liquid stocks, however, significantly reduces the liquidity of these
stocks, resulting in liquidity deterioration or dry-up among the highly liquid stocks in periods
of high market-wide liquidity demand. We find that the effects of asset fire sale on stock
prices as documented in Coval and Stafford (2007) are most prominent among the highly
liquid stocks and are largely driven by common liquidity demands.
We start our analysis by looking at how US actively managed equity funds hold liq-
uid assets. Essentially, if it holds more liquid assets, a fund’s large selling needs would be
shared by a variety of liquid assets. The fund would be able to avoid the selling crowds,
and the selling pressure on specific stocks is less likely to happen. We compare the funds’
value-weighted portfolio liquidity and that of their corresponding benchmark index funds.
Following Berk and Binsbergen (2015), a fund’s benchmark is determined among eight Van-
guard index funds. The evidence shows that funds in our sample generally tend to maintain a
portfolio that is less liquid than their respective benchmarks. The lower benchmark-adjusted
holding liquidity indicates that funds would be likely to rely more on the smaller fraction of
their liquid assets when it comes to liquidity needs, and increases the likelihood of creating
pressure on the liquidity of these assets.
In order to explore how funds utilize their liquidity, we first look at how funds’ trading
activities change with the increase of liquidity needs. Specifically, we regress the fund sale
of each quarter on a dummy variable that indicates the time when the fund experiences
extremely low flows. The fund sale is defined as the dollar value of the stocks sold by the
fund during a quarter over the dollar value of its holdings in the prior quarter. We find
that funds tend to sell more of their holdings when facing outflows. This indicates that the
1Koch, Ruenzi and Starks (2015) indicate that mutual funds are a typical group of investors who have
time-varying liquidity demands resulting from the fund net flows. Thus, the observable fund flows is an
important indicator of the fund liquidity demand.
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liquidity demand from funds would increase for stocks that they hold. We further interact
the fund net flows with market state indicators, namely the aggregate market flow or the
VIX index of implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. The test shows that funds are
forced to sell even more during bad market states.
If funds treat liquid stocks and illiquid stocks equally when they need to sell, the selling
pressure on specific liquid stocks is also less likely to happen because the selling pressure
would be shared by wide categories of stocks. We thus examine whether funds have any stock
preferences when they have to sell. We calculate the fund sell liquidity as the value-weighted
liquidity of a fund’s sell trades over the value-weighted liquidity of the fund holdings minus
one. The variable captures whether the proportion of liquid stocks among the fund’s sell
trades is greater than that among the fund holdings. We find that the fund sell portfolio tend
to be more liquid stocks facing negative flows. This indicates that funds tilt towards selling
more liquid stocks when they need more liquidity. We further find that the stock liquid
sale is more during high VIX periods, when the market is more volatile and more funds are
likely to demand liquidity. The evidence is generally consistent with studies such as Brown,
Carlin and Lobo (2010) and Manconi Massa and Yasuda (2010) and Jotikasthira, Lundblad
and Ramadorai (2009). Thus, while funds hold less liquidity than their benchmarks, they
tend to utilize more liquidity when necessary. The way in which funds hold and trade liquid
assets places significant selling pressure on a small number of stocks because the trades are
concentrated in these stocks.
We next investigate how stock liquidity is endogenously affected by liquidity demand for
a stock. To proxy for the liquidity demand for a stock, we use actual sales of the stocks
by actively managed mutual funds. However, mutual funds also sell stocks for information
reasons, which have little to do with liquidity needs. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate
the selling actions due to liquidity needs from those due to information purposes. Alexander,
Cici and Gibson (2006) and Coval and Stafford (2007) both stress the importance of fund
flows in determining the motivations of trades. Specifically, when mutual funds sell with
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concurrent heavy outflows, the trades are more likely to be due to liquidity needs. Therefore,
each quarter we construct a stock’s liquidity demand, forced sale (FS), by aggregating the
shares of the stock that are sold by mutual funds which experience extreme negative fund
flows.2 We examine the effect of liquidity demand on stock liquidity by regressing change
in stock liquidity on its FS measure. Consistent with the model of Eisfeldt (2004), we find
that a stock experiencing higher liquidity demand becomes less liquid during the concurrent
quarter. The evidence indicates that widespread liquidity demand generally deteriorates the
stock liquidity.
The sensitivity of liquidity to the liquidity demands may be different in liquid and illiquid
stocks, since funds are more likely to sell liquid stocks than illiquid stocks when liquidity is
required. We next interact our FS measure with an indicator that represents stocks falling
into the most liquid tertile. This cross-section test shows that the liquidity deterioration
exists mostly among liquid stocks. The evidence is consistent with our earlier findings that
funds sell more liquid stocks to fulfill their liquidity needs, which in turn make these stocks
suffer more from the forced sale.
The influence of liquidity demand on stock liquidity could be intensified by market con-
ditions, as a number of studies suggest (Vayanos, 2004; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009;
Ben-Rephael, 2014, Bigio, 2015). When the market is more volatile, more funds experience
outflows and, therefore, the market-wide demand for liquidity increases. We further explore
how the effect of liquidity demand varies across market states. Specifically, we split the
sample period into low and high market flow periods, based on the median aggregate market
flow across the sample period. Subsample analysis is conducted for the two different periods.
We find that the reduction in liquidity for liquid stocks from forced sale is greater in more
volatile market times. The liquidity of illiquid stocks, on the other hand, does not appear
to be affected as severely by the forced sale. Nor is the liquidity of illiquid stocks decreased
during volatile market states.
2The aggregated shares are scaled by the stock’s total shares outstanding as of last quarter end.
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The liquidity demand from funds can create temporary price effects on the stocks, as
shown in Coval and Stafford (2007), in the form of asset fire sales. Hence, we expect to find
more price pressures for stocks with greater liquidity demand. The price of stocks with large
liquidity demand would decrease due to the selling pressure, but it will recover in the latter
period since the price drop is not because of information reasons. Therefore, we examine the
price effect on a stock from liquidity erosion by looking at the stock’s return reversal in the
subsequent quarter. Specifically, when sorting stocks based on its FS measure, we find that
stocks in the top FS decile display positive return reversals in the subsequent quarter. We
do not find significant return reversals for stocks in the bottom FS decile. The difference in
the return reversal of the two extreme deciles is significantly different. This indicates that
funds who get stuck in the crowd selling have to pay higher liquidity premium. In our further
extended tests, we find that such price effects are different both cross sectionally and across
varying market states. In particular, stocks in the most liquid quintile experience significant
positive return reversals in the subsequent period when they are sold more for immediacy.
Furthermore, the return reversals of these stocks are more pronounced during periods of low
aggregate market flows. In contrast, illiquid stocks do not experience similar price pressures.
In general, the evidence indicates that the erosion of liquidity in liquid stocks makes the
sales of these stocks more costly.
Our work contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, our work intends to
provide an explanation of individual stock liquidity from the demand side. Chordia, Roll
and Subrahmanyam (2002) show that liquidity levels are affected by trading activities, in
the form of trade imbalance. Næs, Skjeltorp and Ødegaard (2011) document a correlation
between change in investors portfolio composition and stock market liquidity. Following
the strand, previous studies have attempted to explain the change in stock liquidity from
the perspective of the supply side (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009; Nagel, 2012; Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan, 2010), where the market has time-
varying funding constraints. However, the empirical evidence of Brockman and Chung (2002)
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and Bauer (2004) indicates that the supply side explanation cannot fully account for the
whole liquidity story. 3 On the liquidity demand side, studies focus on decoding liquidity
commonality (Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008; Karolyi, Lee and Dijk, 2012; Aymo and Gil-
Bazo, 2013; Koch, Ruenzi and Starks, 2016). That is, different stocks tend to co-move in
liquidity when they are traded by funds at the same time. However, there is little, if any,
empirical evidence on how liquidity demand for a specific stock affects the stock as well as
investors who have to trade it. Our work adds to the literature by filling in this gap.
Second, our paper provides empirical evidence of the endogenous effect of liquidity de-
mand on the stock liquidity level. A strand of literature documents the fund managers’ tilt
toward more liquid stocks during market downturns (Vayanos, 2004; Huang, 2015; Rzeznik,
2016; Ben-Rephael, 2014). They assume that the stock liquidity is exogenous regardless of
the liquidity-driven trading actions. We argue that the large demand of liquid stocks for
immediacy would create a pressure on these stocks as funds are forced to sell them facing
outflows. We find that, instead of remaining highly liquid, liquid stocks that are heavily sold
by mutual funds tend to become less liquid.
Our work also sheds lights on the stock market fragility and fund liquidity management
efficiency. Greenwood and Thesmar (2001) show that a stock can become more fragile due
to correlated liquidity shocks faced by its owners. Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) show that
the sensitivity to market liquidity has increased for large-cap firms, which are more likely
to be liquid, due to increased institutional ownership. Their results indicate that the equity
market is more fragile to liquidity shocks as the ability of large stocks to diversify liquidity
shocks has declined. We show that one source of this stock fragility is the liquidity erosion
due to forced sale, which makes liquidity decrease among liquid stocks that are heavily sold.
Consequently, these liquid stocks are less efficient to act as liquidity cushions. A more recent
3In particular, these studies find that liquidity commonality can be observed from order-driven markets,
where individual investors post their bid and ask offers. Compared to a quote-driven market where market
makers post the bid and ask prices, an order-driven market reflects the public’s liquidity demand and is
hence less subject to the liquidity supply.
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study from Nanda and Wei (2018) show that mutual funds that intentionally reduce their
overlapping in holdings with their peers tend to outperform. We add to the literature arguing
that funds’ such overlap management should concentrate on liquid stocks.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the liquidity measures
and the data. Section 1.3 documents the mutual fund portfolio liquidity and their trades
associated with fund flows. Section 1.4 describes the relation between the liquidity demand
and the change in stock liquidity. Section 1.5 discusses robustness tests. The final section
concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Mutual Fund Data
We obtain mutual fund data from Thompson Reuters CDA/Spectrum Mutual Fund Holdings
Database. Other fund variables are matched to the holdings from CRSP Survivorship-bias
Free Mutual Fund Database using MFLinks. The funds with multiple classes are matched
and aggregated on the WFICN level. We limit our analysis to US actively managed equity
funds from 1993 to 2015.4 A fund must have at least $10 million total net asset (TNA)
as of the prior quarter end to be included. The calendar quarter ends (i.e., March, June,
September and December) are used as the quarter end dates. To derive the trades of the
actively managed funds each quarter, we follow Frazzini and Lamont (2008) and Koch,
Ruenzi and Starks (2015) by filling the missing quarter with the holdings of the funds from
last most recent quarter. However, this is only done for a maximum of a 6-month gap. 5 The
holdings of each fund are also adjusted for split events. Consequently, this leads to 3,805
4As shall be described in the next subsection, the DTAQ data with which we construct liquidity measures
starts from 1993.
5We also try dropping these observations with gaps. This does not alter our findings.
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funds across the sample period and 161,475 fund-quarter observations.
To be consistent with the quarterly frequency of fund holdings, we construct other vari-
ables on the quarterly basis. We measure fund size as the TNA of the fund at the end of
each quarter. Fund return is the fund’s cumulative monthly return within each qurater.
Fund cash is the fraction of a fund’s assets held as cash as of the end of each quarter. We
also construct the quarterly fund flow as the percentage monthly flow aggregated over the
quarter. Specifically, for fund i during month t,
Flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 +Ri,t)
TNAi,t−1
(1)
where TNAi,t is the TNA of fund i at the end of month t, and Ri,t is the fund’s return for
month t. If there is a fund merger involved during month t, the corresponding flow is then
dropped. We also summarize the fund selling activities. Specifically, each period we calculate
the fund sale of a fund as the dollar value of stocks sold by the fund over the dollar value
of the fund stock holdings as of last quarter end. For the purpose of later analysis, we also
construct the fund sell liquidity (SellLiquidity), defined as the value-weighted liquidity of a
fund’s sell trades during a certain quarter over the value-weighted fund portfolio liquidity in
the prior quarter. Specifically, for each fund in quarter q,
SellLiquidityi,t =
∑
w˜j,qLMj,q−1∑
wi,q−1LMi,q−1
− 1 (2)
where w˜j,q is the dollar-value weight of stock j, which is sold by the fund during quarter q,
among all the stocks that are sold by the fund during the same quarter. wi,q−1 is the dollar-
value weight of stock i held by the fund in quarter q− 1. LMj,q−1 and LMi,q−1 represent the
stock’s liquidity in quarter q−1. We employ four liquidity measures, namely, NormAmihud,
QSpread, RSpread and ESpread to represent the stock liquidity. 6 SellLiquidity intends
6The construction of the four liquidity measures will be discussed in the next subsection.
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to capture a fund’s trading preferences to liquid stocks. The numerator of the first term in
Eq.(2) captures the value-weighted liquidity of the fund’s sell trades, while the denominator
captures the value-weighted liquidity of the fund’s portfolio. The ratio is then compared
with 1. Therefore, a more negative level of SellLiquidity in Eq.(2) indicates that the fund
sells more liquid stocks than illiquid stocks. 7
We winsorize all the variables at 5% and 95% level to reduce the influence of outliers. The
full-sample summary statistics of fund-level characteristics is reported in Panel A, Table 1.1.
Funds in our sample display an average quarterly return of 2.2% and an average cash ratio of
3.0%, with the median 2.8% and 1.4%, respectively. The fund flow has a mean of 1.7% and a
median of -0.8%. The fund sale has a mean of 0.201. The mean of SellLiquidity as measured
in Eq.(2) ranges from -0.264 to 0.731. SellLiquidity as measured with NormAmihud and
ESpread shows a sell portfolio that is more liquid than the fund portfolio, with a negative
mean of -0.018 and -0.265, respectively. SellLiquidity as measured in QSpread and Rspread,
on the other hand, displays a positive mean of 0.066 and 0.731, respectively. Panel B
and Panel C report the fund characteristics during the period of 1993-2003 and 2004-2015,
respectively. Funds in the later period display a lower average fund net flow, with a mean of
0.4% during 2004-2015 compared to 3.7% during 1993-2003. Similarly, fund appear to hold
less cash during the period of 2004-2015 compared to earlier times, with a mean of 5.3% in
Panel B versus 2.8% in Panel C. The lower net fund flows and less cash holding in the later
subperiod may be due to the shocks from the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
1.2.2 Liquidity Measures and Stock Characteristics
We employ four measures in the analysis for stock liquidity. The first measure is derived
from the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio. The data is obtained from CRSP daily stock files
dataset. Specifically, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (Amihud) for stock i in month m
7As shall be described in the next subsection, the four liquidity measures actually measure the “illiquidity”
of the stock. Thus, a liquidity measure is smaller if the stock is more liquid.
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is defined as follows,
Amihudi,m =
1
Di,m
Di,m∑
t=1
|ri,t|
|dvoli,t| (3)
where Di,m is the number of days with available data in month m, ri,t is the return of
stock i on day t , and dvoli,t is the dollar trading volume for stock i on day t. To reduce
the influence of outliers, we follow Acharya and Petersen (2005) to normalize the Amihud’s
(2002) illiquidity ratio. The normalized Amihud is defined as follows,
NormAmihudi,m = min(0.25 + 0.30 ∗ Amihudi,m ∗ Ct−1, 30) (4)
where Ct−1 is the factor ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the market portfolio capital-
ization as of the end of month t to that of the end of July 1962. As the mutual fund holding
data is on a quarterly basis, we construct the quarterly Amihud’s ratio by averaging the
monthly Amihud illiquidity over each quarter.
The Amihud (2002) ratio captures the price impact and is considered most efficient among
daily illiquidity measures in paralleling high-frequency measures , as argued by Hasbrouck
(2009). In their comparisons of a group of liquidity measures, Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka
(2009) also show that the Amihud (2002) measure does a good job in measuring liquidity.
However, a more recent study from Lou and Shu (2017) find that, instead of measuring the
compensation for illiquidity, the Amihud (2002) captures the mispricing from the trading
volume. Therefore, to ensure the robustness of the test, we construct the other three illiquid-
ity measures, namely percent quoted spread (QSpread), percent realized spread (RSpread)
and percent effective spread (ESpread), from intraday tradings to represent the stock liq-
uidity level.8 The trade and quote data are obtained from the NYSE Daily Trade And
8In the study of Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009), RSpread and ESpread win the majority of the
horseraces.
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Quote (DTAQ) database, which has the frequency of millisecond. 9 Following Holden and
Jacobsen (2014), for stock i at time t,
QSpreadi,t = (Aski,t −Bidi,t)/Mi,t (5)
RSpreadi,t = 2Di,t(Pi,t −Mi,t+5)/Mi,t (6)
and
ESpreadi,t = 2Di,t(Pi,t −Mi,t)/Mi,t (7)
where Aski,t is the highest ask price of stock i at time t, Bidi,t is the lowest bid price of stock
i at time t, Mi,t is midpoint of Aski,t and Bidi,t of stock i at time t, Mi,t+5 is midpoint of
stock i at time t+ 5, Pi,t is the transaction price of stock i at time t, and Di,t is an indicator
with the value 1 for buy orders and -1 for sell orders. Di,t is determined according to the
algorithm of Lee and Ready (1991).
Each of the three liquidity measure is first averaged within a day during market hours to
form a daily measure. While the daily QSpread is a time-weighted average, daily ESpread
and daily RSpread are both share-weighted averages. The daily measure is then averaged
over the month. To build a quarterly measure for our tests, the monthly measure is further
averaged within each quarter. As the DTAQ data is only available from 1993, our analysis
spans from 1993 to 2015.
A wide range of literatures considers certain firm characteristics, such as firm size and
return volatility, as determinants of stock liquidity. Following previous literature, we obtain
stock level characteristics as control variables from CRSP monthly database, as reported in
9Holden and Jacobsen (2014) argue that liquidity measures constructed from the Monthly Trade And
Quote (MTAQ) databese turn out to largely differ from those constructed from DTAQ due to withdrawn
quotes, relatively low frequency (seconds in MTAQ versus milliseconds in DTAQ) and other reasons. They
argue that the DTAQ database has less potential measuring errors.
11
Table 1.2. Specifically, we measure firm size as the market capitalization as of the end of each
quarter. Ret(-12,-1) is defined as cumulative stock monthly return over the past 12 months
to capture potential information-motivated trades. We also define the return volatility as
the standard deviation of a stock’s monthly return over the past 12 months. Koch, Ruenzi
and Starks (2015) show a demand-side source of liquidity commonality through mutual fund
ownership. Thus, we obtain another two control variables from the mutual fund holdings to
capture the liquidity commonality component. The first variable is mutual fund ownership
(MF ownership), defined as the number of shares of a stock held by mutual funds scaled
by total shares outstanding of the stock at each quarter. The other variable is mutual fund
holding concentration (MF concentration), which is defined as the number of shares of a stock
held by the top five mutual funds that hold the most shares of the stock. The full sample
summary is reported in Panel A, Table 1.2. The sample consists of 231,505 firm-quarter
observations, with both stock level characteristics, MF ownership and MF concentration
data available. Ret(-12,-1) and return volatility have fewer observations because they need
to be constructed with available data from the past 12 months. Firms included in the sample
display an average positive perior-year performance of 22.6% and a median of 10.9%. The
return volatility on average is 12.6%. In addition, stocks in our sample have an average MF
ownership of 15.9% and MF concentration of 0.8%. The median firm has 14.9% of its shares
owned by mutual funds and 0.4% of its shares owned among the top five mutual funds that
hold the stock. Panel B and Panel C report the summary statistics for the period of 1993-
2003 and 1994-2015, respectively. The stocks held by the funds during 2004-2015 seem to be
relatively liquid stocks, with three out of four liquid measures displaying lower means and
all of the four displaying lower medians compared to those of 1993-2003. Moreover, stocks
held by funds in the second half tend to have lower prior-year return, lower return volatility,
higher MF ownership and MF concentration.
To present a clearer picture of stocks’ cross-sectional characteristics, in Table 1.3 we report
the stock level characteristics using the one-way sort on one of the stock liquidity measure,
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QSpread.10 In particular, each quarter we sort stocks held by funds in the sample into
quintiles based on its QSpread as of last quarter end. Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that stocks
at the most liquid quintile (Q1) tend to be larger firms with better past-year performance
and lower return volatility. More importantly, these stocks are also more widely held by
mutual funds, with a higher level of MF ownership but a lower level of MF concentration.
The widespread ownership for liquid stocks indicates that these stocks are more likely to be
used when it comes to liquidity needs, and that the “crowd” of selling these stocks are more
likely to form. The subperiod statistics in Panel B and Panel C show similar patterns to
those in Panel A across the QSpread quintiles.
1.2.3 Measure for Liquidity Demand
In order to proxy for the liquidity demand for a stock, we use actual sale of the stock
by the actively managed mutual funds in our sample. However, funds also sell stocks for
information reasons, which have little to do with liquidity needs. Studies such as Cao, Simin
and Wang (2013) also show that mutual funds may trade for timing the market liquidity.
Consequently, it is hard to document the relation of liquidity demand and liquidity change as
causal. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate the selling actions due to liquidity needs from
those due to information purposes. Besides, an ideal environment should be where a high
liquidity demand can be detected and trades for liquidity reasons can be easily identified.
Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2006) and Coval and Stafford (2007) both stress the im-
portance of fund flows in determining the motivations of trades. Specifically, when mutual
funds sell with concurrent heavy outflows, the trades are more likely to be due to liquidity
needs. The situation is also relatively exogenous because funds are “forced” to do so. Each
quarter we construct a fund’s trades on a stock by calculating the difference in the mutual
fund holding of the stock between adjacent quarters. Hence, a positive difference in the stock
10The patterns of the stock level characteristics similar when stocks are sorted on the other three liquidity
measures.
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holdings identifies the fund’s buy trade (Buy) for the stock, while a negative difference in the
stock holdings identifies the fund’s sell trade (Sell) of the stock. If a stock does not appear
in the last quarter, we assume that the stock is initially bought for the current quarter and
make the traded shares equal to the stock’s holding; If a stock fails to show up in the next
quarter end, we assume that this stock is completely sold during the next quarter and make
the traded shares of the stock in the next quarter as the negative of the current quarter’s
stock holding.
Each quarter we require that a stock be held by at least ten mutual funds to be included
in the sample. We identify the liquidity demand for stock i at quarter q, forced sale (FS) ,
as the shares of the stock i sold by funds whose flow is at the bottom flow quintile at quarter
q, scaled by the total shares outstanding of the stock as of last quarter end, adjusted by split
events. Specifically,
FSi,q =
∑
j(max(0,−Selli,j,q)|flowj,q < 20thPercentileq)
SharesOutstandingi,q−1
(8)
where Selli,j,q is the sell trade of fund j on stock i in quarter q. For stock i at quarter
q, a high forced sale stands for a high liquidity demand from actively managed funds. The
summary statistics of the stock forced sale is reported in Table 1.2. Stocks held by these
funds have an average FS ratio of 0.466% . Stocks seem to have a higher average FS level
during the period of 2004-2015 (0.482%) than that during the earlier half (0.447%). Looking
at the FS ratio of stocks with different liquidity levels in Panel A of Table 1.3, most liquid
stocks (Q1) tend to have the highest average FS ratio at 0.558%, while illiquid stocks (Q5)
have an average FS ratio of 0.121%.
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1.3 Mutual Fund Holding Liquidity and Liquid Stock
Sale
1.3.1 Mutual Fund Holding Liquidity
Like all the other investors, mutual funds face the risk-return tradeoff (Ippolitp,1989). On
one hand, funds hold a fraction of their assets as the most liquid ones in order to withstand
the market crash and liquidity shocks. If funds widely hold liquid stocks, the large forced sale
of one certain stock is less likely to happen, because the pressure would be shared by a variety
of stocks. On the other hand, however, mutual funds’ goals of outperforming the benchmark
may lead them to bet on more stocks that are riskier and less liquid. Consequently, their
liquid holdings may be limited to only a small fraction of the funds’ total assets and thus
cause the selling pressure on these stocks upon liquidity shocks.
In this subsection, we explore mutual funds’ portfolio liquidity by comparing their holding
liquidity with their respective benchmarks. Essentially, if it holds more liquid assets, a
fund’s large selling needs would be shared by a variety of liquid assets. The fund would be
able to avoid the selling crowds, and the selling pressure on specific stocks is less likely to
happen. We follow Berk and Binsbergen (2015) to use the eight Vanguard’s index funds as the
benchmarks.11 To determine the benchmark for a fund, we run a time-series regression of the
fund’s quarterly returns on those of each of the eight Vanguard index funds. The benchmark
for the fund is the index fund which yields the greatest R-square in the regression. Since the
eight index funds appear at different time periods, for each quarter, we only compare the
11In their paper, Berk and Binsbergen (2015) use eleven indexes funds, but three of them are international
funds and are excluded here. Thus, the eight Vanguard’s index funds used in our paper are: Vanguard
S&P 500 Index Fund (VFINX), Vanguard Extended Market Index Fund (VEXMX), Vanguard Small-Cap
Index Fund (NAESX), Vanguard Value Index Fund (VVIAX), Vanguard Balanced Index Fund (VBINX),
Vanguard Mid-Cap Index Fund (VIMSX), Vanguard Small-Cap Growth Index Fund (VISGX), Vanguard
Small-Cap Value Index Fund (VISVX).
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R-squares of the index funds that already exist during the quarter.
Table 1.4 reports the benchmark-adjusted liquidity, which is calculated as the average
difference in fund liquidity from that of their respective benchmarks. The difference is first
averaged across the funds during the same quarter and then averaged across all quarters.
As can be seen in Panel A, the actively managed funds in the sample tend to be less liquid
than the benchmark, with the full-sample benchmark-adjusted liquidity positive in all of
the four measures. We next sort the funds based on the fund TNA each quarter. We find
that small funds are inclined to be less liquid than large funds compared to the benchmark.
This evidence is consistent with Massa and Phalippou (2004), who show that mutual fund’s
portfolio liquidity is negatively related to the fund size. The evidence is also consistent
with Chen et al. (2004) in that larger funds need more stock ideas and thus expand their
holdings to liquid assets. Studies such as Golec (1996) and Daniel et. al (1997) indicate that
funds with different investment objectives tend to hold stocks with different characteristics
and thus have different return implications. In Panel B, we look at the benchmark-adjusted
liquidity by sorting the funds in our sample on the CRSP investment objective code. We
focus on only funds with the objective code as Micro funds (CI), Small-cap funds (CS),
Medium-cap funds (CM), Balanced funds (YB), Income funds (YI), Growth funds (YB)
and Style funds (S).12 The cap-based funds have similar patterns as in Panel A, with funds
greater in size more liquid then their respective benchmark. In particular, CM funds tend to
be more liquid than the benchmark while both CI funds and CS funds hold less liquidity than
their benchmarks. Moving to yield-based funds, it shows that funds with more aggressive
investment goals hold less benchmark-adjusted liquidity. In particular, YG funds tend to
hold less benchmark-adjusted liquidity than YI funds. YI funds display less-than-benchmark
liquidity measured with NormAmihud and QSpread. The benchmark-adjusted liquidity of
YI funds tend to be indifferent with the RSpread measure and marginally positive with
12The CRSP investment objective code also identifies S&P 500 index funds as Large-cap funds (CL), which
are excluded from our sample.
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ESpread. While benchmark-adjusted liquidity of YI funds is hard to define, it is smaller
than that of YG funds across all of the four liquidity measures. The evidence is consistent
with Da, Gao and Jagannathan (2010), who show that liquidity provision is more important
for income-oriented funds. Overall, while CM funds and YI funds show some evidence to be
more liquid than the benchmark, most of the funds in the sample tend to be less liquid than
their respective benchmark. If liquid stocks are what these funds turn to when it comes to
liquidity needs, the lower-than-benchmark liquidity indicates that funds have to rely more
on the smaller fraction of liquidity stocks, which would aggravate selling pressure on these
stocks.
1.3.2 Mutual Fund Liquid Stock Sale
The subsection above shows that actively managed funds tend to hold less liquidity than
the benchmark. The lower-than-benchmark holding liquidity implies that funds would likely
rely more on their liquid assets when facing liquidity needs, and increase the likelihood of
creating pressure on the liquidity of these assets. However, another possibility can be that
funds treat the stocks that they hold indiscriminately when they need to sell facing liquidity
needs. In this case, the selling pressure on specific liquid stocks is less likely to happen
because funds are able to diversify the pressure by selling wide categories of stocks.
In this subsection, we explore how funds utilize their liquidity. we first look at how funds’
trading activities change with the increase in liquidity needs. Table 1.5 reports the regressions
of fund sale on the fund flow. We define the fund sale as the fraction of fund portfolio dollar
value sold during a certain quarter. As we focus on the situation where funds experience
negative flows and thus need to sell, we use a dummy variable, NegF low, to account for
the effect of negative fund flows. NegF low is a dummy indicator which is equal to one if
the flow of a fund is falling into the bottom flow quintile during a certain quarter. Fund
fixed effects are included in each regression and coefficients are clustered on both the fund
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level and the time level. As shown in Column (1) of Table 1.5, a fund has greater fund sale
when its flow is more negative. Intuitively, when it experiences heavy outflows, a fund has
to sell more in order to cover the customer redemptions. In Column (2), NegF low remains
significant after adding fund-level control variables, including the logarithm of fund TNA,
quarterly fund return and fund cash ratio.
To explore how the effect of negative fund flows on the fund sale varies across market
states, we also interact NegF low with market conditions. We use two measures to reflect
market conditions. The first measure is logarithm of the S&P 500 Volatility Index price
(log(V IX)) obtained from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) following the lit-
erature (e.g. Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen and Singleton, 2010; Bao, Pan, and Wang, 2011;
Nagel, 2012; Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992; Poon and Granger, 2003; Chung and Chu-
wonganant (2014)). For quarter q, the VIX price used is the price as of the last trading day
of quarter q − 1. For the second measure of market conditions, each quarter we calculate
the aggregate market flow as of the prior quarter end and then rank them across the sample
period. We denote Mktflow as a dummy indicator, which is equal to one if the aggregate
market flow as of last quarter end is below the median level, and zero otherwise. The regres-
sions with the interaction item are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.5. In both
regressions, the interaction item is positive and significant. The result indicates that funds,
facing negative flows, sell more during bad market states.
We next explore the fund trading preference. Essentially, funds is likely to sell liquid
stocks first when they have to sell in order to reduce the price impact. We regress a fund’s sell
liquidity on the negative fund flow indicator, NegF low, and the market condition indicators.
The dependent variable is the fund sell liquidity, SellLiquidity, as defined in Eq.(2). As
discussed in Section 1.2.1, SellLiquidity intends to capture a fund’s trading preferences to
liquid stocks. NegF low is constructed with the four liquidity measures. NegF low and the
market condition indicators are defined as in Table 1.5. The results are reported in Table 1.6.
Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) of Table 1.6 report the regression on only the fund flow and
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other control variables. The results show that when it experiences negative flows, the fund
value-weighted sell liquidity is higher than that of the fund portfolio. This indicates that the
fund sells more of its liquid stocks than illiquid stocks. In Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11), we
add the interaction of NegF low with the logarithm of VIX, Log(V IX). The coefficients are
negative and significant across the four measures. This shows that during high VIX periods,
funds tilt towards selling even greater portion of liquid stocks facing outflows. Note that the
dependent variable captures the ratio instead of the trading quantity. In other words, when
the dependent variable, SellLiquidity, becomes more negative, it indicates that quantity of
liquid stocks sold proportionally increases more than that of illiquid stocks sold. Hence, the
regressions with log(V IX) as the market state indicator show that funds increase the sale
of liquid stocks more than that of illiquid stocks. Moving to the regressions with Mktflow
interacting with NegF low, the interaction items do not appear to be significant in Columns
(3), (6), (9) and (12). The proportion of liquid stock sale does not seem to increase during
low market flow periods. However, with the coefficients of NegF low negative and significant,
funds still tend to sell more liquid stocks.
In summary, Table 1.6 shows that when facing negative flows, funds prefer to selling more
liquid stocks than illiquid stocks, especially during market turmoil. Our overall evidence
is aligned with Manconi Massa and Yasuda (2010), Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi
(2012), and Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai (2009), who document that funds tend
to liquidate liquid assets first during market downturns to reduce the price impacts.
1.4 Liquidity Demand and Change in Liquidity
Section 1.3 shows that, while they generally hold less liquidity than their benchmarks, ac-
tively managed funds count more on liquid stocks when faced with large outflows and when
the market is turbulent. It indicates that the liquidity demand from funds are likely to
exert pressure on the liquidity of stocks that are heavily traded by these funds if the large
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liquidity need is widespread. Eisfeldt (2004) develops a theoretical model with adverse se-
lection, indicating that stock liquidity is lower due to adverse selection, which is determined
by the amount of trades for reasons other than private information. Hence, trades due to
non-information reasons, such as liquidity needs, would affect the asset liquidity. This indi-
cates that even liquid stocks can become highly illiquid when stocks are coordinately sold
by institutions without any news but liquidity needs. In this section, we empirically explore
how a stock’s liquidity is affected by the liquidity demand for the stock.
1.4.1 Forced Sale and Change in Liquidity
To test the effect of liquidity demand for a stock from mutual funds at the same time, the
quarterly change in each stock’s liquidity is regressed on the forced sale of the stock and
other variables. Specifically,
∆LMi,q = αi + aFSi,q + bXi,q−1 + cMq−1 + εi,q (9)
where ∆LMi,q is the change of one of our four liquidity measures for stock i over quarter
q, FSi,q is the forced sale of stock i as defined in Eq.(8), Xi,q−1 is a vector of firm level
characteristics at the end of quarter q − 1 as control variables, and Mq−1 is a vector of
market wide variables, including the market excess return and market liquidity at the end of
quarter q− 1. Xi,q−1 includes the firm-level characteristics as defined above in Table 1.2. In
addition, we also add the mean of the liquidity measure over the prior four quarters, Prior
LM , and the lag of the dependent variable, ∆LMi,q−1, to take into account the possible
liquidity level reversal from the last period. We include firm fixed effects to account for
the time-invariant firm variation that could also likely affect the stock liquidity level. The
coefficients are all clustered on both the firm and the time level.
The effect of forced sale is reported in Table 1.7. In particular, the coefficients of the
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main variable, FS, are significant and positive in the regressions with all of our four liquidity
measures. This indicates that, as it faces a higher level of forced sale, the stock’s liquidity
tends to decrease. Therefore, when a stock is traded more due to the liquidity demand from
funds, the stock becomes less liquid. This evidence is consistent with the model of Elsfeldt
(2004), in that the liquidity of an asset could be determined endogenously by the amount of
trade for non-information reasons such as liquidity needs. Moving to controlling variables,
the results show that the stock liquidity level decreases more among stocks that are greater in
firm size, more widely held by mutual funds and that perform worse for the past 12 months.
These stocks are more likely to be ones that are originally liquid. Therefore, the effect of
FS seems to influence liquid stocks more. Hameed, Kang and Viswanthan (2010) show that
the stock liquidity is affected more among high-volatility stocks, as these stocks suffer more
from the funding constraints. Thus, we also include the stock return volatility to control
for the funding constraints from the liquidity supply side. FS is still significant after taking
into account the stock’s liquidity supply. Moreover, the market excess return is negatively
related to stock liquidity. Specifically, the result shows that the change in stock liquidity
is more positive when the market excess return is negative. This indicates that the change
in stock liquidity may differ across market states. Overall, the liquidity demand for a stock
reduces the stock liquidity.
1.4.2 Liquidity Demand and Cross-sectional Change in Liquidity
In Section 1.3, we show that when facing negative flows, actively managed funds tend to
sell relative liquid stocks. A strand of literature has shown similar evidence. For example,
Brown, Carlin and Lobo (2010) show that investors could have a myopic insight to liquidate
liquid assets when there is an immediate need for cash. Manconi Massa and Yasuda (2010)
document the sell-offs among liquid securities of mutual funds during the 2007-2009 financial
crisis. Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai (2009) show that when funds are faced with
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outflows, they are likely to sell the most liquid stocks in the portfolio to reduce the price
impact. Thus, for liquid stocks that are widely held by funds, a “crowd” of selling these
stocks is more likely to form and in turn affect the stocks’ liquidity, in comparison with
illiquid stocks.
In this subsection, we explore the cross-section difference in the effect of liquidity demand.
Specifically, we introduce an interaction item of FS and a dummy variable, Liquid, which
is equal to one if the stock is at the most liquidity tertile as of last quarter end13, and zero
otherwise. In particular,
∆LMi,q = αi + aFSi,q + bFSi,q ∗ Liquid+ cXi,q−1 + dMq−1 + εi,q (10)
Xi,q−1 and Mq−1 are the same as defined in Eq.(9). We also put a middle tertile dummy,
which is one if the stock is in the middle liquidity tertile and zero otherwise, in the analysis to
account for the difference between the middle tertile and the extreme tertiles. The regressions
are reported in Table 1.7. Again, firm fixed effects are included and the coefficients are
clustered on both the firm and the time level. The coefficients of FS becomes significantly
negative, as it represents the relation between the forced sale and the liquidity change among
least liquid stocks. Interestingly, this result indicates that the forced selling actions seem
to improve the liquidity of illiquid stocks. This may attribute to the fact that these stocks
are not frequently traded. Consequently, any trade would help mitigate the mispricing and
narrow the spread. However, the interaction item is positive and significant in all of the
four regressions, indicating that the effect of forced sale is quite different for liquid stocks
compared to illiquid stocks. In particular, the forced sale tend to deteriorate the stock
liquidity of liquid stocks. In terms of the magnitude, the interaction item is greater than
forced sale in most cases, indicating that liquid stocks are more likely to be less liquid in the
next period. Besides, the middle tertile variables display similar coefficients to the liquid
13Quintile breakpoints are also used, the results are similar.
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tertile but not as greater in magnitude. The overall results are consistent with those in Table
1.7, in that the forced sale actions create more pressure on the liquidity of liquid stocks.
1.4.3 Liquidity Demand and Market States
A lot of studies link market liquidity with market volatilities. For example, Vayanos (2004)
develops a model to show that liquid stocks are more valuable due to performance-induced
withdrawals. In the model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), they show that the high
market volatilities would lead to liquidity spiral. When the overall market liquidity is low,
mutual funds are more likely to experience heavy outflows (Huang, 2015). The forced sale
is then greater. Besides, since liquid stocks are among the first to be sold during volatile
periods, the forced sale that liquid stocks experience should be greater. It implies that the
effect of forced sale on liquid stocks would be higher during turbulent market times. In
this section, we explore the effect of liquidity demand on stock level liquidity under varying
market conditions.
We repeat the regression in Eq.(10) by partitioning the sample into two groups based on
the market conditions. We use the overall market flow to represent the market conditions.
In particular, we calculate the aggregate market flow of each quarter and rank them. The
quarters in the sample are then split into two groups based on the time-series median market
flow. A quarter is identified as the low-market-flow quarter if its aggregate market flow is
below the median market flow level across our sample period. The analysis is reported in
Table 1.9. The regressions during low market periods are reported in Columns (1), (3), (5)
and (7), while higher market flow periods in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). In groups of all
the four measures, the interaction of forced sale with the liquid tertile dummy, FS ∗Liquid,
is greater when the aggregate market flow is lower. Thus, liquid stocks’ liquidity hurts more
by the forced sale actions when the market is overall bad. Several studies have documented
market liquidity spiral during extremely bad market times (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
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2009; Nagel, 2012; NÆS, Skjeltorp and ØDegaard, 2011). Our evidence shows that the
liquidity of liquid stocks decreases during these periods, which coincides with the market
liquidity spiral. In unreported analysis, we also divide the market states using the VIX
index from CBOE, the results are consistent. In a nutshell, liquid stocks that are frequently
used by distressed funds for liquidation experience large pressure on the stock liquidity,
especially during bad market times.
1.5 Price Effects
Previous sections show that the funds’ widespread liquidity demand for a stock erode the
stock liquidity, especially that of liquid ones. Essentially, it arises from the investors’ sen-
timent for liquid stocks when it comes to liquidity needs and thus would exert impacts on
the stock prices (Frazzini and Lamont, 2008). Coval and Stafford (2007) show that the liq-
uidity demand from funds can create temporary price effects on the stocks, in the form of
asset fire sales. The price of stocks with large liquidity demand would decrease due to the
selling pressure, but it will recover in the latter period since the price drop is not because of
information reasons. With stocks affected differently by the liquidity demand across ex ante
liquidity levels and across market states, the pricing implications could also be different. In
this section, we explore the stock price effects following the forced sale.
Inspired by the methodology of Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) and Coval and
Stafford (2007), each quarter we rank the stocks on its FS into deciles. We then calculate
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the average abnormal returns (ARs) over the
subsequent quarter. Each month, abnormal returns are calculated by following Daniel et al.
(1997) (DGTW). The DGTW-adjusted excess returns are constructed on both the equal-
weighted and the value-weighted basis. ARs and CARs of each decile are first averaged
across the stocks within the same quarter and then across the quarters. In our effort to
replicate the evidence of Coval and Stafford (2007), we find consistent results and report it
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in Appendix Table. The results show a monotonic pattern across forced sale deciles. Stocks
experiencing greater forced sale display stronger price effects and greater return reversals in
the subsequent quarter.
The abnormal return represents the compensation for the liquidity deterioration of the
stocks that suffer from the flow-induced liquidity selling. Therefore, funds that sell these
stocks pay higher liquidity premium. During volatile market times, when the overall market
funding is constrained and mutual fund are more likely for liquid selling, the stock liquidity
should be affected more and the price effect thus greater. We thus examine how the price
effects change across varying market times. We partition the sample into normal times
and relative volatile periods based on the aggregate market flows. A quarter is defined
as volatile periods when the aggregate market flow of this quarter is below the median
aggregate market flow across our sample period. We then calculate CARs and ARs on both
the value-weighted (VW) and equal-weighted (EW) basis for each group. The results are
reported in Table 1.10. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 1.10, stocks at the top FS decile
do not seem to have significant return reversals following the forced sale during normal
market times. The difference in abnormal returns between the top and bottom decile is
not significant. During volatile market times, however, stocks falling in the top FS decile
display significant abnormal return reversals in the subsequent quarter, with VW (EW) CAR
of 1.544% (1.518%) and VW (EW) AR of 0.498% (0.483%). The difference between the top
and bottom FS decile significantly different. This is consistent with our prior evidence
that stock liquidity is eroded more during volatile market times, when the market liquidity
provision is limited and liquidity demand surges. Investors thus ask for higher compensations
to provide liquidity.
We next examine the cross-sectional price effects. We show in Section 1.3 and 1.4 that
mutual funds have greater sentiment for liquid stocks and that the liquidity of liquid stocks
are decreased more. In Table 1.11, we report the ARs and CARs across different stock liq-
uidity levels. Each quarter, we do a unconditional double way sort. Stocks are divided into
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five liquidity quintiles based on its ex ante liquidity level represented by four liquidity mea-
sures. Stocks are also categorized into five FS quintiles. As can be seen in Table 1.11, across
all of the four liquidity measures, liquid stocks display significant differences in both ARs
and CARs between the top and the bottom FS quintile. Liquid stocks tend to experience
greater price impacts experiencing the forced sale, while illiquid stocks, again, do not display
striking return differences across FS quintiles. One potential concern is that the significant
difference in returns between extreme FS quintiles under NormAmihud and QSpread might
be driven by the underperformance at the low FS quintile instead of the positive return re-
versal from top FS quintile. We attribute to the measure deficiency. Lou and Shu (2017)
show that the Amihud ratio captures the price impact from the trading volume component
instead of the return-to-volume ratio. Hence, the significant underperformance of Low FS
quintile in Table 1.11 with NormAmihud may capture the mispricing from trading volume
instead of the liquidity premium. Moreover, Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) show
that ESpread and RSpread are more efficient as liquidity measures compared to QSpread.
Thus, our evidence is reliable with RSpread and ESpread better capturing price effects.
To examine the price effects on both the liquidity and time dimension, we also repeat
the test in Table 1.11 for different market times. Table 1.12 reports the cross-sectional price
effects across varying market states. Consistent with Table 1.10, Panel A of Table 1.12 shows
little evidence of the price effects during high market flow periods. Liquid stocks as measured
by NormAmihud show some evidence of having significant price impact differences between
the bottom and top FS quintile. Again, this may capture the mispricing due to trading
volume. The return reversal is more pronounced for liquid stocks with greater forced sale
during low market period, as can be seen in Panel B of Table 1.12. Illiquid stocks do not seem
to have great price impacts. Overall, the evidence in this section extends that of Coval and
Stafford (2007), showing that the price effects of the widespread liquidity demand is different
across the stock liquidity levels and across market states. Liquid stocks experience greater
price impacts when experiencing greater forced sale, especially during market turmoil.
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1.6 Robustness Tests
We further perform additional analysis to ensure the robustness of our analysis. First,
Koch, Ruenzi and Starks (2015) argue that the stock liquidity can be affected by mutual
fund common ownership. Specifically, if a stock is widely held by a large group of mutual
funds, they are likely to trade the stock at the same time. Consequently, the pressure
exerted on the stock might be greater. Following their spirit, we also look at how a stock is
coordinately traded by a group of mutual funds using an alternative measure that accounts
for the correlated trades among mutual funds. Specifically,
FSi,t =
(N Selli,t|flowj,t < 20thPercentilet)
N alli,t−1
(11)
where N Selli,t is the number of funds selling stock i at time t, and N alli,t−1 is the total
counts of mutual fund owners for stock i at time t − 1. The results with this alternative
measure, not tabulated for the sake of brevity, are qualitatively consistent with the ones that
are presented.
Second, the forced selling activities of liquid securities are well documented for extreme
market downturns such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis (e.g. Manconi, Massa and Yasuda,
2010; Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi, 2012). During the financial crisis, the market
liquidity dries up, so do the liquidity of liquid stocks. Hence, it is possible that the positive
effect of selling pressure on liquid stocks illiquidity is mainly driven by the crisis periods.
In unreported tests, we exclude the financial crisis periods (from 2007 Q3 to 2009 Q1) to
eliminate the influence from extreme events. Our findings still stand.
Third, we show that our results are robust across varying benchmarks, cut-off points, and
measures. Specifically, in comparing the fund holding liquidity with benchmarks, we also use
the 19 indexes benchmark as suggested in Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Specifically, each
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quarter a fund’s benchmark is the index that this fund is least deviated from in holdings.14
The results are consistent.
In addition, to ensure that our results is not driven by any outliers. We also try con-
structing the four liquidity measures using the fractional rank. In particular, each quarter,
each stock is ranked among the stock universe based on each of the four liquidity measures
we construct. The stock will then be assigned a “rank”, which is a decimal between 0 and 1,
for each of the four measures. A lower rank means that the stocks is more liquid compared
to its peers on the market. The rank is also representative of a stock’s relative liquidity
“hierarchy”. Our results still stand.
1.7 Conclusion
We explore several questions related to the effect of liquidity demand on the individual stock
liquidity level. We find that domestic actively managed equity funds in general hold less
liquidity than their corresponding benchmarks. This leads them to rely more on the small
fraction of liquid assets for immediacy when faced with financial distress and significant
outflows. We further find that mutual funds tilt toward selling more of liquid stocks when
they are faced with negative fund flows. Consistent with prior literature that funds have
to meet redemptions and reduce price impact, their engagement in liquid stock sale is more
severe during market turmoil. Consequently, a widespread liquidity shock would be more
likely to exert pressure on the liquidity of the liquid stocks they sell.
Using the mutual fund involuntary sale to proxy for the exogenous widespread liquidity
demand, we find that a stock with a greater level of mutual fund forced sale tends to be
less liquid in the next period. This liquidity erosion exists mostly among liquid stocks. We
14The 19 indexes that Cremers and Petajisto (2009) are: S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 600, S&P 500/Barra
Value, S&P 500/Barra Growth, Russell 1000, Russell 2000, Russell 3000, Russell Midcap, and the value and
growth components of the four, Wilshire 5000, and Wilshire 4000. Due to limited data availability for all
the Russell and Wilshire indexes, we use instead the index funds that replicate these indexes.
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further find that the liquidity demand deteriorates liquid stocks’ liquidity even more during
volatile periods, when more funds face outflows and are forced to sell. However, it does
not appear to affect illiquid stocks similarly. The liquidity deterioration is also followed by
positive return reversals in the subsequent quarter, especially for liquid stocks and during
bad market times. Thus, funds who have to trade in the traffic will need to pay higher
liquidity premium and are likely to sacrifice fund returns. Thus, it is critical for funds
to avoid overlapping their portfolios with others, especially when it comes to liquid stocks
holdings.
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Table 1.1
Fund-level Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the mutual funds in the sample across
the firm-quarter observations. A fund has at least $10 million total net asset to
be included in the sample each quarter. Log(TNA) is logarithm of the total net
asset of the fund at the end of each quarter. Fund return is the fund’s cumulative
monthly return within each quarter. Fund cash is defined as the fraction of a
funds asset held as cash at the end of each quarter. Fund flow is the fund’s
percentage monthly flow aggregated over the quarter, where a fund’s monthly flow
is calculated using Eq.(1). Fund sale is the dollar value of stocks sold by a fund
during a certain quarter over the dollar value of the fund stock holdings as of
last quarter end. Sellliquidity is the value-weighted liquidity of stocks sold by a
fund during a certain quarter over the value-weighted fund portfolio liquidity, as
defined in Eq.(2). Panel A reports the full-sample summary. Panel B reports the
summary for the period of 1993-2003. Panel C reports the summary for the period
of 2004-2015. All the variables are winsorized at 5% and 95% level.
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Table 1.1
Fund-level Summary Statistics
N Mean Median Std 25% 75%
Panel A: 1993-2015
log(TNA) 161475 5.508 5.452 1.818 4.179 6.749
Fund return 161475 0.022 0.028 0.094 -0.023 0.076
Fund cash 97415 0.030 0.014 0.055 0.003 0.035
Fund flow 161475 0.017 -0.008 0.144 -0.040 0.038
Fund sale 161475 0.201 0.161 0.157 0.079 0.282
SellLiquidity
NormAmihud 161475 -0.018 0.000 0.157 -0.031 0.016
QSpread 161475 0.066 0.029 0.345 -0.171 0.251
RSpread 161475 0.731 0.505 0.988 0.041 1.187
ESpread 161475 -0.265 -0.363 0.382 -0.529 -0.093
Panel B: 1993-2003
log(TNA) 63829 5.314 5.254 1.781 4.013 6.515
Fund return 63829 0.021 0.026 0.106 -0.035 0.080
Fund cash 14577 0.053 0.032 0.068 0.012 0.067
Fund flow 63829 0.037 0.002 0.162 -0.032 0.058
Fund sale 63829 0.212 0.165 0.175 0.070 0.313
SellLiquidity
NormAmihud 63829 -0.030 -0.003 0.222 -0.076 0.025
QSpread 63829 0.070 0.031 0.381 -0.199 0.289
RSpread 63829 1.034 0.774 1.163 0.174 1.625
ESpread 63829 -0.023 -0.088 0.440 -0.358 0.245
Panel C: 2004-2015
log(TNA) 97646 5.635 5.601 1.831 4.304 6.891
Fund return 97646 0.022 0.029 0.086 -0.015 0.074
Fund cash 82838 0.028 0.013 0.053 0.003 0.032
Fund flow 97646 0.004 -0.014 0.128 -0.045 0.025
Fund sale 97646 0.194 0.160 0.145 0.084 0.265
SellLiquidity
NormAmihud 97646 -0.010 0.000 0.091 -0.016 0.012
QSpread 97646 0.063 0.028 0.320 -0.155 0.227
RSpread 97646 0.534 0.375 0.794 -0.015 0.925
ESpread 97646 -0.423 -0.455 0.227 -0.572 -0.304
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Table 1.2
Stock-level Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics on the stock-level characteristics across the
firm-quarter observations. NormAmihud, QSpread, RSpread and ESpread are the
liquidity measures, namely normalized Amihud illiquidity ratio, percentage quoted
spread, percentage realized spread and percentage effective spread, as defined in
Eq.(4), Eq.(5) and Eq.(6) and Eq.(7), respectively. Log(Size) is the logarithm of
stock market capitalization as of the end of each quarter. Ret(-12,-1) is defined as
the stock’s cumulative return over the past 12 months. Return volatility is defined
as the stocks monthly return standard deviation over the past 12 months. MF own-
ership is defined as the number of shares held by mutual funds scaled by total shares
outstanding of the stock as of the end of each quarter. MF concentration is defined
as the number of shares held by the top five mutual funds that hold the most shares
of the stock, scaled by total shares outstanding of the stock, as of the end of each
quarter. FS is stock’s quarterly forced sale as defined in Eq.(8). Each quarter, we
require that the stock be held by at least ten funds in order to be included. Panel
A reports the full-sample summary. Panel B reports the summary for the period
of 1993-2003. Panel C reports the summary for the period of 2004-2015. All the
variables are winsorized at 5% and 95% level.
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Table 1.2
Stock-level Summary Statistics
N Mean Median Std 25 % 75%
Panel A: 1993-2015
NormAmihud 231505 1.038 0.314 3.064 0.263 0.565
QSpread (%) 231505 0.698 0.379 0.931 0.150 0.876
RSpread (%) 231505 0.382 0.154 0.600 0.055 0.461
ESpread (%) 231505 0.649 0.416 0.720 0.202 0.839
log(Size) 231505 6.760 6.575 1.607 5.617 7.731
Ret(-12,-1) 224862 0.226 0.109 0.854 -0.141 0.394
Return volatility 224862 0.126 0.105 0.086 0.073 0.154
MF ownership 231505 0.159 0.149 0.095 0.083 0.223
MF concentration 231505 0.008 0.004 0.015 0.002 0.009
FS (%) 231505 0.466 0.165 0.769 0.013 0.572
Panel B: 1993-2003
NormAmihud 102966 0.829 0.329 2.038 0.269 0.583
QSpread (%) 102966 1.036 0.737 0.992 0.399 1.329
RSpread (%) 102966 0.579 0.320 0.721 0.106 0.809
ESpread (%) 102966 0.864 0.657 0.758 0.362 1.123
log(Size) 102966 6.683 6.486 1.514 5.606 7.575
Ret(-12,-1) 98763 0.250 0.107 0.933 -0.150 0.412
Return volatility 98763 0.137 0.113 0.092 0.078 0.168
MF ownership 102966 0.145 0.131 0.087 0.077 0.199
MF concentration 102966 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.007
FS (%) 102966 0.447 0.120 0.826 0.002 0.503
Panel C: 2004-2015
NormAmihud 128539 1.206 0.303 3.677 0.260 0.548
QSpread (%) 128539 0.428 0.191 0.781 0.090 0.435
RSpread (%) 128539 0.224 0.095 0.419 0.038 0.239
ESpread (%) 128539 0.476 0.275 0.638 0.139 0.548
log(Size) 128539 6.821 6.655 1.676 5.628 7.862
Ret(-12,-1) 126099 0.207 0.111 0.786 -0.133 0.380
Return volatility 126099 0.118 0.100 0.080 0.069 0.144
MF ownership 128539 0.170 0.165 0.099 0.091 0.239
MF concentration 128539 0.010 0.005 0.018 0.002 0.010
FS (%) 128539 0.482 0.203 0.719 0.027 0.621
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Table 1.3
Summary Statistics Across Stock Liquidity Levels
This table reports the stock-level characteristics and the forced sale pressure measures
using one-way sorts on the one of the stock liquidity measures, QSpread. QSpread
is the percent quoted spread as defined in Eq.(4). In particular, each quarter we sort
stocks into quintiles based on QSpread as of last quarter end. We then calculate
the average stock characteristics across the firm-quarter observations within each
quintile . N represents the number of firm-quarter observations. Log(Size) is the
logarithm of stock market capitalization as of the end of each quarter. Ret(-12,-1) is
defined as the stock’s cumulative return over the past 12 months. Return volatility
is defined as the stocks monthly return standard deviation over the past 12 months.
MF ownership is defined as the number of shares held by mutual funds scaled by
total shares outstanding of the stock as of the end of each quarter. MF concentration
is defined as the number of shares held by the top five mutual funds that hold the
most shares of the stock, scaled by total shares outstanding of the stock, as of the
end of each quarter. FS is stock’s quarterly forced sale as defined in Eq.(8). All the
variables are winsorized at 5% and 95% level.
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Table 1.3
Summary Statistics Sorted on Stock Liquidity Level
Liquid (Q1) Q2 Q3 Q4 Illiquid (Q5)
Panel A: 1993-2015
N 87049 64556 46079 26170 7641
NormAmihud 0.284 0.422 0.857 2.419 11.173
QSpread (%) 0.280 0.576 0.990 1.295 2.686
RSpread (%) 0.137 0.316 0.590 0.738 1.251
ESpread (%) 0.295 0.549 0.893 1.207 2.129
log(Size) 8.186 6.505 5.712 5.166 4.447
Ret(-12,-1) 0.256 0.261 0.210 0.104 0.077
Return volatility 0.101 0.136 0.151 0.143 0.124
MF ownership 0.180 0.173 0.138 0.110 0.094
MF concentration 0.003 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.019
Forced sale (%) 0.558 0.517 0.425 0.244 0.121
Panel B: 1993-2003
N 47743 30043 19284 5122 1364
NormAmihud 0.299 0.542 1.293 4.724 14.422
QSpread (%) 0.455 1.023 1.852 3.107 5.825
RSpread (%) 0.208 0.549 1.117 1.954 3.785
ESpread (%) 0.433 0.864 1.456 2.391 4.438
log(Size) 7.796 6.113 5.383 4.779 4.175
Ret(-12,-1) 0.299 0.281 0.158 -0.065 -0.173
Return volatility 0.111 0.154 0.168 0.167 0.160
MF ownership 0.160 0.139 0.123 0.127 0.138
MF concentration 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.017 0.026
Forced sale (%) 0.480 0.454 0.399 0.355 0.449
Panel C: 2004-2015
N 39306 34113 26795 21048 6277
NormAmihud 0.264 0.316 0.544 1.858 11.011
QSpread (%) 0.068 0.178 0.370 0.855 5.825
RSpread (%) 0.050 0.108 0.211 0.442 3.785
ESpread (%) 0.128 0.267 0.487 0.919 4.438
log(Size) 8.659 6.855 5.949 5.260 4.460
Ret(-12,-1) 0.204 0.245 0.246 0.142 0.088
Return volatility 0.088 0.121 0.140 0.138 0.123
MF ownership 0.203 0.204 0.148 0.106 0.092
MF concentration 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.017 0.019
Forced sale (%) 0.627 0.594 0.444 0.217 0.105
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Table 1.4
Fund Benchmark-adjusted Liquidity
This table reports the average difference in liquidity measures between the
funds in the sample and their respective benchmark. For each mutual fund,
a time-series regression of its quarterly return is run on the return of each of
the eight Vanguard domestic index funds as in Berk and Binsberen (2015).
The benchmark for the mutual fund for a quarter is the one which yields
the greatest R-square and is available during the quarter. Panel A reports
the average difference in liquidity measures sorted on the fund size as of
last quarter end. Panel B reports the average difference in each of the
four liquidity measures by the CRSP investment objective code. The funds
objectives that are reported are Micro funds (CI), Small-cap funds (CS),
Medium-cap funds (CM), Balanced funds (YB), Income funds (YI), Growth
funds (YB) and Style funds (S). The difference is first averaged across the
fund during the same quarter and then averaged across all quarters. t-stats
are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Sort on Fund Size
Full Small S2 S3 S4 Big
NormAmihud 0.0072 0.0490 0.0111 -0.0027 -0.0240 -0.0258
(1.68) (5.37) (4.66) (3.09) (1.32) (1.59)
Qspread 0.0421 0.0575 0.0500 0.0322 0.0341 0.0302
(7.75) (8.28) (7.27) (6.40) (5.73) (6.16)
Rspread 0.0313 0.0487 0.0403 0.0316 0.0298 0.0256
(8.31) (9.35) (8.13) (7.64) (6.12) (7.49)
Espread 0.0363 0.0413 0.0336 0.0287 0.0278 0.0218
(8.72) (8.31) (7.57) (7.73) (6.80) (7.51)
Panel B: Sort on Fund Objectives
CI CS CM YI YB YG S
NormAmihud 1.0406 0.0872 -0.2915 -0.0875 0.0263 0.0429 0.0665
(52.20) (8.22) (-13.88) (-12.35) (9.94) (9.12) (5.01)
Qspread 0.4874 0.1097 -0.0773 -0.0048 0.0292 0.0187 0.0566
(14.90) (7.49) (-10.03) (-1.82) (8.36) (6.06) (5.83)
Rspread 0.4043 0.0984 -0.0496 0.002 0.0188 0.0084 0.0536
(19.47) (7.91) (-9.96) (0.87) (8.01) (4.02) (7.19)
Espread 0.2603 0.0939 -0.0298 0.0021 0.0124 0.0072 0.0421
(11.36) (7.68) (-6.38) (1.97) (7.00) (3.56) (6.96)
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Table 1.5
Mutual Fund Sale, Fund Flows and Market States
This table reports the regressions of the fund sale on fund flows. The dependent
variable is the fund sale, defined as the fraction of fund portfolio dollar value sold
during a certain quarter. NegF low is a dummy variable that is equal to one if
the fund’s concurrent percentage quarterly flow falls into the bottom flow quintile
compared to the rest of the funds in the sample. log(V IX) is the logarithm of the
VIX index of implied volatility of S&P 500 index options as of the end of prior
quarter. Mktflow is a dummy indicator, which is equal to one if the aggregate
market flow of the concurrent quarter is below the median level, and zero otherwise.
Log(TNA) is logarithm of the total net asset of the fund at the end of each quarter.
Fund return is the fund’s quarterly return as of the end of each quarter. Fund cash
is defined the fraction of a funds asset held as cash at the end of each quarter. Fund
fixed effects are included and the coefficients are clustered on both the fund level
and the time level. t−statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance
is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NegF low 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.076***
(42.05) (40.03) (5.48) (39.84)
NegF low*log(V IX) 0.003**
(2.24)
NegF low*Mktflow 0.007**
(2.12)
log(V IX) 0.002
(1.19)
Mktflow -0.003
(-0.37)
log(TNA) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-5.58) (-6.01) (-5.56)
Fund return 0.024 0.028 0.023
(0.79) (0.96) (0.76)
Cash 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.049***
(2.87) (3.24) (2.84)
Constant 0.184*** 0.232*** 0.226*** 0.233***
(70.99) (20.74) (7.53) (20.49)
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 161475 97415 97415 97415
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.062 0.062 0.062
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Table 1.6
Mutual Fund Sell Liquidity, Fund Flows and Market States
This table reports the regressions of the fund sell liquidity on variables associated with fund
flows , market volatility and other control variables. The dependent variable is the fund sell
liquidity as defined in Eq.(2). log(V IX) is the logarithm of the VIX index of implied volatility
of S&P 500 index options as of the end of prior quarter. Mktflow is a dummy indicator, which
is equal to one if the aggregate market flow of the concurrent quarter is below the median level,
and zero otherwise. NegF low is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the fund’s concurrent
percentage quarterly flow falls into the bottom flow quintile compared to the rest of the funds
in the sample. Log(TNA) is logarithm of the total net asset of the fund at the end of each
quarter. Fund return is the fund’s quarterly return as of the end of each quarter. Fund cash is
defined the fraction of a funds asset held as cash at the end of each quarter. Columns (1), (4),
(7) and (10) report the regression on only NegF low and other control variables. Columns (2),
(5), (8) and (11) report regressions on NegF low, the interaction of NegF low with Log(V IX),
and other control variables. Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) report regressions on NegF low,
the interaction of fund flow with Mktflow, and other control variables. In Panel B, Columns
(1), (4), (7) and (10) report the regression on only NegF low and other control variables.
Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) report regressions on NegF low, the interaction of NegF low
with Log(V IX), and other control variables. Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) report regressions
on NegF low, the interaction of fund flow with Mktflow, and other control variables. Fund
fixed effects are included and the coefficients are clustered on both the fund level and the time
level. t−statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and
*** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7
Regressions of Change in Stock Liquidity on Forced Sale
This table reports the regressions of the following model,
∆LMi,q = αi + FSi,q + bXi,q−1 + cMq−1 + εi,q
where ∆LMi,q is the change of one of the four liquidity measures for stock i at quarter q.
Xi,q−1 is a vector of firm level characteristics at the end of quarter q − 1, including the firm
size, Ret(-12,-1), stock return volatility, MF ownership and MF concentration. Mq−1 is a
vector of market wide variables, including the market excess return and market illiquidity at
the end of quarter q − 1. Prior LM is the average of the stock liquidity measure over the
last four quarters. ∆LMt−1 is the lag of the dependent variable. Column (1) to Column (4)
reports the regressions with NormAmihud, QSpread, RSpread and ESpread, respectively, as
the liquidity measure. Firm fixed effects are included to account for the time invariant firm
variation. The coefficients are all clustered on both the firm level and the time level. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NormAmihud QSpread RSpread ESpread
FS 0.464** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.011***
(2.34) (2.63) (2.69) (3.13)
Prior LM 0.011*** 0.052** 0.017 0.018
(6.99) (2.41) (1.18) (1.14)
∆LMt−1 -0.095*** -0.087** -0.276** -0.224*
(-5.25) (-1.97) (-2.26) (-1.88)
log(Size) 0.007* 0.002*** <0.001 <0.001
(1.85) (2.81) (0.82) (0.68)
MF ownership 0.101*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001***
(4.29) (3.35) (2.33) (3.10)
MF concentration -1.178* -0.015 -0.007 -0.015
(-1.94) (-1.36) (-1.03) (-1.56)
Ret(-12,-1) -0.007** <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(-2.33) (0.13) (1.01) (0.85)
Return volatility -0.028 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(-0.65) (-3.61) (-3.03) (-3.83)
Market excess return -0.324** -0.005 -0.003* -0.005**
(-2.30) (-1.64) (-1.75) (-2.12)
Market illiquidity 0.031 -0.113** -0.152* -0.098
(0.63) (-2.40) (-1.88) (-1.37)
Constant -0.083** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001
(-1.97) (-2.64) (-0.67) (-0.49)
Obs. 205562 205541 205557 205557
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.063 0.099 0.079
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.8
Cross-sectional Effect of Forced Sale on Stock Liquidity
This table reports the following regression,
∆LMi,q = αi + FSi,q + FSi,q ∗ Liquid+ bXi,q−1 + cMq−1 + εi,q
where ∆LMi,q is the change of one of the four liquidity measures for stock i at quarter
q. Liquid is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is at the most liquid tertile as
of last quarter end. Xi,q−1 is a vector of firm level characteristics, including the firm
size, Ret(-12,-1), stock return volatility, MF ownership and MF concentration, at the
end of quarter q− 1. Mq−1 is a vector of market wide variables, including the market
excess return and market liquidity at the end of quarter q−1. ∆LMt−1 is the liquidity
change at quarter q − 1. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the regressions with
NormAmihud, QSpread, RSpread and ESpread, respectively. Middle is a dummy
variable which is equal to one if the stock is at the middle liquidity tertile. Firm fixed
effects are included and the coefficients are clustered on both the firm and the time
level. t−statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by
*, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NormAmihud QSpread RSpread ESpread
FS*Liquid 3.259*** 0.042*** 0.034*** 0.065***
(4.24) (2.66) (3.46) (3.35)
FS -3.029*** -0.033** -0.026*** -0.054***
(-3.62) (-2.11) (-2.96) (-3.10)
Liquid 0.123*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(9.22) (4.44) (5.79) (3.64)
FS*Middle 2.973*** 0.039** 0.029*** 0.061***
(3.57) (2.44) (3.27) (3.45)
Middle 0.064*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(6.01) (3.76) (5.60) (3.29)
∆LMt−1 -0.078*** -0.070 -0.247** -0.198*
(-4.41) (-1.63) (-2.16) (-1.84)
log(Size) -0.012*** <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(-3.36) (-1.28) (-0.90) (-1.02)
MF ownership -0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(-0.12) (0.65) (-1.15) (-0.68)
MF concentration 0.018 -0.005 0.003 <0.001
(0.03) (-0.43) (0.51) (0.01)
Ret(-12,-1) -0.005* <0.001 0.001* <0.001
(-1.91) (0.50) (1.78) (1.52)
Return volatility -0.120*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(-2.93) (-4.37) (-3.62) (-4.16)
Market excess return -0.346** -0.005* -0.003* -0.005**
(-2.47) (-1.66) (-1.82) (-2.21)
Market illiquidity -0.120** -0.087** -0.213*** -0.159**
(-2.53) (-2.21) (-3.11) (-2.53)
Constant 0.043 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(1.03) (-0.70) (-0.93) (-0.34)
Obs. 207369 207350 207367 207367
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.032 0.108 0.086
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.9
Stock Liquidity, Forced Sale and Market States
This table reports the regressions of stock liquidity change on the mutual fund forced
sale of the stock across varying market states. A quarter with the market aggregate
flow as of the last quarter end lower than the median market flow level across the
sample period is defined as low market flow periods. Otherwise, a quarter is defined
as high market flow periods. Under both low flow periods and high flow periods, we
run the following regression,
∆LMi,q = αi + aFSi,q + bFSi,q ∗ Liquid+ cXi,q−1 + dMq−1 + εi,q
where ∆LMi,q is the change of one of the four liquidity measures for stock i at quarter
q. Liquid is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is at the bottom illiquid tertile
(most liquid) as of last quarter end. Xi,q−1 is a vector of firm level characteristics,
including the firm size, Ret(-12,-1), stock return volatility, MF ownership and MF
concentration, at the end of quarter q− 1. Mq−1 is a vector of market wide variables,
including the market excess return and market liquidity at the end of quarter q − 1.
∆LMt−1 is the change in liquidity at quarter q−1. Middle is a dummy variable which
is equal to one if the stock is at the middle tertile. Firm fixed effects are included
and the coefficients are clustered on both the firm and the time level. t−statistics are
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.12
Cross-Section Abnormal Stock Returns Following Forced Sale across Market
States
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for liquid stocks and illiquid stocks
following the forced sale under varying market states. Each quarter the stocks sorted on its liq-
uidity (NormAmihud, QSpread, ESpread, and RSpread) as of last quarter end into quintiles.
Independently, stocks are ranked on its FS into quintiles. We then calculate the CARs over
the subsequent quarter by averaging first within the illiquidity quintiles of the same period and
then across the quarters. A quarter with the market aggregate flow as of the last quarter end
lower than the median market flow level across the sample period is defined as low market flow
periods. Otherwise, a quarter is defined as high market flow periods. Panel A reports CARs
for stocks that are most liquid (G1) and least liquid (G5) under low market periods. Panel
B reports CARs for stocks that are most liquid (G1) and least liquid (G5) under high market
periods. Abnormal returns are calculated by following Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW). Abnor-
mal returns for each stock are measured in excess of both equal-weighted and value-weighted
DGTW portfolios. t-statistics are reported below each variable in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
Political Connections and the Resolution of Debt
Restructuring
2.1 Introduction
The government’s involvement in the bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors led to
considerable debate among practitioners and academics on the potential conflicts of interest
arising from politically connected claimholders.15 In these cases, the claims of the politically
powerful unions were elevated above other claimholders, resulting in higher recovery rates
for unions compared to creditors with greater or equal priority. Building on these concerns,
we examine how firms with and without politically connected debtors resolve distress. We
use the term, debtor, throughout the paper to refer to shareholders’ agents, such as the
board of directors and top executives. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to
empirically examine the effects of politically connected debtors on the resolution of distress.
Debtors have strong incentives to avoid liquidation (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991) and
therefore use their political capital to promote the suboptimal continuation of unprofitable
firms. Furthermore, banks and hedge funds can be pressured into granting concessions to
politically connected debtors in order to earn the good graces of regulators, which will lead to
suboptimal outcomes and deviations from absolute priority. For example, some authors argue
that banks did not fight the rulings in the Chrysler and General Motors cases because these
same banks were also recipients of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Warburton,
15See Warburton (2010) for a concise summary of the ongoing debate.
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2010).
Politically connected debtors can also pressure bankruptcy judges into approving certain
provisions in the bankruptcy code that are costly to creditors or result in inefficient out-
comes.16 For example, politically connected debtors can tacitly compel bankruptcy judges
to approve super-priority debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing that could result in the sub-
optimal continuation of unprofitable firms; this would ultimately be harmful for existing
creditors (White, 1989; Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Triantis, 1993; Ayotte and Gaon,
2011). Furthermore, bankruptcy judges can approve the sale of the firm’s assets without
the approval of creditors in what is known as a “363 sale.”17 This type of sale is one of the
most controversial points in the Chrysler bankruptcy. In the Chrysler case, “Old Chrysler”
sold all of its assets to “New Chrysler” which is owned by a subset of Old Chrysler’s cred-
itors, DIP lenders, and the unions. As part of the sale, the unions received equity in New
Chrysler worth billions of dollars that amounted to a 55% recovery rate. Old Chrysler’s
secured lenders only recovered 29% of the value of their claims and other unsecured credi-
tors received nothing (Warburton, 2010). These outcomes represent substantial deviations
from priority and arguably preferential treatment to the politically powerful unions that are
also unsecured claimholders. While we agree that Chrysler’s bankruptcy contains unique
circumstances, whether preferential treatment of politically connected claimholders is com-
monplace is an interesting empirical question to finance researchers, because the potential
costs to claimholders associated with the resolution of distress is a prominent feature of many
corporate finance theories.
We propose and test several hypotheses to examine the extent to which a debtor’s political
connections affect the resolution of distress. First, if debtors use their political connections
16Despite the considerable influence bankruptcy judges have on the bankruptcy process, they do not enjoy
the tenure and salary protections enjoyed by other federal judges. The lack of these protections makes them
more susceptible to political pressures than other federal judges (LoPucki, 2006; Gennaioli and Rossi, 2010).
17In a typical Chapter 11, claimholders vote on a plan of reorganization that dictates asset sales and
the various distributions of the proceeds to creditors. However, a 363 sale only requires the approval of the
bankruptcy judge. Several authors have suggested that 363 sales are used to by-pass the voting requirements
in Chapter 11 (Warburton, 2010).
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to obtain favorable treatment from bankruptcy judges at the expense of creditors and/or to
pressure creditors to restructure their debts out of court, then politically connected firms will
be more likely to reorganize their debts outside the bankruptcy court. This is a natural con-
clusion, all else equal, if the bankruptcy costs for creditors in firms with politically connected
debtors are higher than in firms without politically connected debtors. Then, creditors of
firms with politically connected debtors are more likely to agree to an out-of-court (i.e., pri-
vate) restructuring or an exchange offer than creditors of firms without politically connected
debtors.
Second, given that debtors typically have incentives to reorganize distressed firms rather
than liquidate them (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991), it is probable that debtors use their
political capital to force creditors to agree to reorganizations of economically unviable firms.
Thus, firms with politically connected debtors are more likely to reorganize under Chapter
11 compared to firms without politically connected debtors. Furthermore, if this higher
incidence of reorganization is solely due to political pressures, we expect that firms with
politically connected debtors are more likely to undergo additional rounds of distressed
restructuring following emergence from bankruptcy compared to firms without politically
connected debtors.
Finally, recent research has documented that politically connected firms enjoy greater
access to credit (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Chiu and Joh, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Cull and Xu,
2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Faccio, 2010), and this
evidence may be due to these firms receiving government bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, and
McConnell, 2006). Such implicit guarantees will reduce creditors’ concerns about the future
prospects of distressed firms. Hence, firms with politically connected debtors are more
likely to be reorganized than those without. However, unlike the case where debtors use
their political capital to force reorganizations of economically unviable firms, we expect to
observe that firms with implicit guarantees are less likely to undergo additional restructuring
following emergence from bankruptcy.
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Our study employs two different measures of political connections. Following Faccio,
Masulis and McConnell (2006) and Faccio and Hsu (2016), we search the biographies of each
firm’s key personnel (top executives and board members) in the Capital IQ database for
keywords that indicate a political connection.18 We require the firm to have such connections
at the time of filing for bankruptcy or undertaking an out-of-court debt restructuring. Our
first measure of political connections is a dummy indicator that takes the value of one if the
firm is politically connected. The other proxy is the total number of politically connected
key personnel in Capital IQ for a given firm-year; this proxy measures the strength of a firm’s
political connections.
Our empirical findings are summarized as follows. Based on a sample of 514 Chapter 11
cases and 105 out-of-court debt restructurings occurring between 1991 and 2004, we provide
evidence that politically connected firms are more likely to restructure their debts in an
out-of-court restructuring versus in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.19 This finding is consistent
with the prediction that political connections improve debtors’ bargaining power vis-a`-vis
creditors.
Following the existing literature, we test the relationship between political connections
and bankruptcy outcomes by separating distressed firms into three different groups of Chap-
ter 11 outcomes, namely reorganization, acquisition, and liquidation (Hotchkiss, 1995). We
find that politically connected firms are more likely to reorganize rather than liquidate under
18We employ the following 43 keywords: governor of the state; senator; congress; house of representatives;
United States Department of Commerce; White House; congressman; democratic; republican; President
Bush; President Obama; President Clinton; Department of the Treasury; National Economic Counsel; sen-
ate; Department of the State; Department of Defense; Department of the Interior; Department of Agricul-
ture; Department of Labor; Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Housing and Urban
Development; Department of Energy; Department of Education; Department of Veterans Affairs; Depart-
ment of Homeland Security; Environmental Protection Agency; EPA; Office of Management and Budget;
United States Trade Representative; United States Ambassador to the United Nations; Council of Economic
Advisers; Small Business Administration; Congressional; legislature; legislative; Republican Party; GOP;
Republican National Committee; Democratic Party; Democratic National Committee; President Reagan;
President Carter.
19 We limit the sample to cases filed before 2005 to maintain a constant regulatory environment due
to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Further, we need
several years of post restructuring data to avoid a truncation bias in our tests examining post-bankruptcy
performance.
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Chapter 11. This evidence is suggests that politically connected debtors use their political
capital to force reorganizations of economically unviable firms and/or that political benefits
such as implicit guarantees increase the going-concern values of firms with politically con-
nected debtors. In order to investigate which of these two explanations is more consistent
with the data, we examine the tendencies of firms with and without politically connected
debtors to require additional restructuring following emergence from bankruptcy.20 We find
that firms with politically connected debtors are less likely to undergo a second distressed
restructuring within five years of completing the initial debt restructuring compared to firms
without politically connected debtors. The data suggest that politically connected debtors
add to the going concern value of distressed firms rather than force the continuation of
economically unviable firms.
One concern with our results is that economically viable firms (i.e., those that should
be reorganized) may be more willing to bear the cost of becoming politically connected
when they face financial distress as the expected long-term benefits of political connections
may be greater for these firms. Hence, our results may be biased towards finding that
politically connected firms are more likely to reorganize successfully. In order to mitigate
this concern, we reconstruct our measure of political connections and only define firms as
politically connected if the connection was in place prior to the onset of financial distress. Our
results remain materially unchanged using this alternative measure of political connections.
Additionally, we find several other pieces of evidence that corroborate our main findings.
First, we find that firms with politically connected debtors emerge from bankruptcy with
capital structures that are closer to their industry peers compared to firms without politically
connected debtors. Several authors have commented on the inability of distressed firms to
reduce leverage to the level of industry peers upon emergence from Chapter 11 (see, for
example, Hotchkiss, 1995; Gilson, 1997; Kahl, 2002). In particular, Kahl (2002) suggests
20Recidivism rates have been used as evidence of suboptimal reorganizations in several other papers (see,
for example, Hotchkiss (1995) and Altman, Kant, and Rattanaruengyot (2009)).
53
that when creditors are uncertain about the firm’s prospects they will keep the firm on a
“short leash” by imposing high levels of leverage. Thus, evidence that firms with politically
connected debtors are able to reduce leverage to industry levels suggests that creditors are
more certain about the economic viability of these firms.
Second, creditors in firms with politically connected debtors are more likely to exchange
their debt claims for equity than creditors in unconnected firms. Creditors typically do
not want to exchange their claims for claims with lower priority in case the firm requires
additional restructuring following emergence from bankruptcy.21 Thus, finding that creditors
in firms with politically connected debtors are more likely to accept equity in exchange for
their debt claims indicates that creditors are more certain of the economic viability of firms
with politically connected debtors than those without. Finally, the stock returns of firms
with politically connected debtors outperform those of firms without politically connected
debtors over the five years following the restructuring. This evidence is also consistent with
political connections improving the going concern value of distressed firms that reorganize.
Overall, our results suggest that debtors use their political connections to avoid filing
for bankruptcy in favor of an out-of-court restructuring. This interpretation makes sense
as bankruptcy is often accompanied by the removal of top executives and a change in cor-
porate control. Conditional on filing for bankruptcy, we find little evidence that politically
connected debtors receive preferential treatment that leads to suboptimal continuation. In
fact, the data suggest that firms with politically connected debtors are less likely to require
additional restructuring following emergence from bankruptcy. Additionally, political con-
nections appear to help resolve some of the uncertainty about distressed firms’ prospects
resulting in post-bankruptcy capital structures that are similar to industry peers.
Our study contributes to the literature on the resolution of distress and political con-
nections in significant ways. First, our research contributes to the literature that focuses on
21Nearly 30% of firms in our sample that emerge from bankruptcy refile for bankruptcy within 5 years of
emergence. This finding is consistent with the 32% recidivism rate reported in Hotchkiss (1995).
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whether bankruptcy judges are influenced by debtors’ political connections (for example, see
Block-Lieb, 1998; Samahon, 2008; McKenzie, 2009). We find evidence that firms with po-
litically connected debtors are more likely to resolve distress by undertaking an out-of-court
restructuring instead of filing for Chapter 11. This finding indicates that Chapter 11 is a
more costly venue to resolve distress for creditors in firms with politically connected debtors.
While our analysis shows little evidence that politically connected debtors receive preferen-
tial treatment under Chapter 11, it does not necessarily rule out the fact that firms with
the most powerfully connected debtors are likely to resolve distress out of court. Overall,
our evidence suggests that political connections improve debtors’ bargaining power vis-a`-vis
creditors’.
Second, our study addresses an outstanding question in the literature as to whether
creditors in firms with politically connected debtors are pressured into taking economically
questionable actions (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006). We find that firms with politi-
cally connected debtors are more likely to resolve distress successfully, an evidence suggesting
that creditors are not being coerced into taking any undesirable action. Hence, our evidence
is more consistent with the hypothesis that political connections provide benefits, such as
implicit guarantees or procurement of government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, and So,
2013).
Finally, we acknowledge that our empirical strategy may not resolve all potential endo-
geneity issues related to firms’ decisions to become politically connected or to choose different
venues to resolve financial distress. However, this is the first paper to empirically examine
the relation between politically connected debtors and the resolution of distress using a large
sample of distressed firms, and therefore, our work serves as a basis for future research in
this area.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the hypotheses. Section 2.3
describes the data. Section 2.4 examines the role of political connections in the bankruptcy
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outcomes and recidivism. Section 2.5 investigates the channel through which political con-
nections help the firms with favorable outcomes. The final section concludes.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
We propose that political connections may improve the bargaining power of debtors vis-a`-
vis creditors. If debtors use their political capital to pressure lenders to provide concessions,
this can result in inefficient reorganizations. However, if debtors use their political capital
to provide creditors with implicit guarantees, then political connections are likely to lead
to more successful resolutions of distress. We present a simple example based on White’s
(1989) model to illustrate these points.
Assume that debtors and creditors are risk neutral and that all information is known
by both the debtors and creditors. The firm has debts outstanding with a face value of
D and assets with a market value of A. The firm is insolvent, such that A < D, and
therefore must restructure. Suppose that the reorganization process proceeds as follows.
First, faced with insolvency, the debtors (the firm’s management) approach the creditors
with a plan to reorganize out of court (OOC). If the creditors do not accept the plan, the
firm files for Chapter 11. Then, if the creditors do not ratify the plan of reorganization in
bankruptcy, the firm is liquidated according to strict priority. The debtors have a first mover
advantage in the sense that under Chapter 11, the firm has exclusive rights to propose a
plan of reorganization.22 While the creditors wait for the debtors to file a plan, the firm
may be undertaking value destroying investments, losing key employees, losing customers,
and accumulating legal fees among other additional costs. These costs, or the threat of these
extra costs in bankruptcy, will allow the debtors to extract concessions from the creditors.
22During our sample period, the Bankruptcy Code §1121(d) allowed a debtor 120 days to exclusively
file a plan or reorganization. However, it placed no expressed limitation on the number or duration of
extensions. Following Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), the
debtor exclusivity period was limited to 18 months.
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We now examine how politically connected debtors affect a firm’s choice of venue for re-
solving distress (i.e. Out-of-court (OOC), Chapter 11 (Ch11), or liquidation (Liq)), bankruptcy
outcomes, and the efficiency of the bankruptcy process. Creditor coordination and hold out
problems may be very costly in an out-of-court restructuring. However, in court-supervised
procedures, all creditors are required to abide by the plan of reorganization; thus, we assume
no hold out problems under Chapter 11 or liquidation. The cost associated with these issues
is represented by H ≥ 0. Let P ≥ 0 represent the firm’s political capital, which is the amount
by which creditors may suffer by not providing concessions. Finally, the costs associated with
restructuring in each venue are represented by COOC ≥ 0, CCh11 ≥ 0, and CLiq ≥ 0, respec-
tively. These costs represent the direct costs associated with each procedure, such as legal
fees and court costs. They also include potential indirect costs of each procedure, such as
the loss of customers or the loss of intangible assets due to a piecemeal liquidation. Thus,
CLiq is most likely greater than CCh11, given that the former includes losses from liquidating
intangible assets, such as human capital. However, if the firm is not economically viable,
then the cost associated with a suboptimal reorganization (CCh11) would be greater than
that associated with a liquidation (CLiq).
We first examine the condition under which the firm is reorganized out of court. In order
for creditors and debtors to agree to an out-of-court reorganization, they must get at least
what they would get in the other venues. Consider the case where A−P −CCh11 > A−CLiq.
Note that this condition also implies that the firm is worth more if it is reorganized (i.e.,
the firm is economically viable) than if it is liquidated. Thus, if the restructuring process
is efficient, the firm will be reorganized. Suppose the debtors offer the creditors an amount
equal to A−CLiq in an out-of-court reorganization. As long as what the creditors receive in
an out-of-court restructuring, A−H−COOC , is at least A−CLiq, the creditors will be willing
to take the deal. However, the creditors also know that if the firm is liquidated, the debtors
will receive less than they would in Chapter 11. Thus, the debtors’ threat of liquidation is
not credible. The lowest amount that the debtors can credibly offer the creditors is then
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A− P − CCh11.
Assuming that H +COOC ≤ P +CCh11, the creditors will accept the offer. The creditors
will receive an amount equal to A−P −CCh11, and the debtors will retain an amount equal
to P + (CCh11 − COOC). The debtors’ first-mover advantage and political connections allow
them to extract this value from the creditors. Furthermore, if the debtors’ political capital
makes a Chapter 11 reorganization more costly to creditors compared to an identical firm
without politically connected debtors, then the firm with politically connected debtors is
more likely to reorganize out of court. This leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Firms with politically connected debtors are more likely to reorganize out
of court than firms without politically connected debtors.
Now suppose
A−H − COOC < A− CCh11 < A− CLiq. (12)
In this case, the debtors are left with nothing if the firm is liquidated and hence, have
strong incentives to use their political connections to coerce creditors into agreeing to a
reorganization (e.g., creditors may be willing to acquiesce to debtors’ demands in order
to gain the good graces of regulators, and/or politically connected debtors may influence
bankruptcy judges to approve actions that are harmful to creditors). Incorporating the costs
of these political threats into equation (12) may result in the following payout,
A−H − COOC < A− CCh11 > A− P − CLiq, (13)
in which case the firm will be reorganized under Chapter 11. However, because A−CCh11 <
A−CLiq, such a reorganization is inefficient (i.e., the firm is not economically viable). This
example implies two empirical predictions. First, compared to an identical firm without
politically connected debtors, those with politically connected debtors are more likely to
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reorganize under Chapter 11 as opposed to being liquidated. Second, firms with politi-
cally connected debtors that reorganize under Chapter 11 are less likely to be economically
viable as going-concerns and therefore are more likely to undergo additional restructuring
after emerging from bankruptcy. These two predictions are formally stated in the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2: Firms with politically connected debtors that file for Chapter 11 are more
likely to be reorganized than those without politically connected debtors.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with politically connected debtors that reorganize under Chapter 11
are more likely to undergo additional restructuring following emergence
from bankruptcy than those without politically connected debtors.
We now consider the case where debtors’ political capital is used to improve the going-
concern value of the firm by providing an implicit guarantee to creditors. Let A′ represent
this improved going-concern value. Further, suppose these benefits do not result in solvency
such that D > A′ > A. Note that this improvement is only valuable in the case when the
firm remains a going-concern. In the case of liquidation, the intangible assets associated with
political connections will be destroyed. This uniform increase in asset values of out-of-court
and Chapter 11 payouts will not alter Hypothesis 1. However, suppose now that the increase
in firm value results in
A′ −H − COOC < A′ − P − CCh11 > A− CLiq. (14)
Under this scenario, the firm will be reorganized under Chapter 11. The firm’s threat of
liquidation is not credible, and the creditors will receive more in a reorganization than in
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a liquidation or in an out-of-court restructuring. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, firms with
politically connected debtors that file for Chapter 11 are more likely to reorganize. Unlike the
previous scenario, however, this reorganization is efficient. The value of the firm reorganized
as a going-concern (A′ − CCh11) is now larger than its value under liquidation (A − CLiq).
This leads to the empirical prediction that if firms with politically connected debtors provide
creditors with an implicit guarantee, then firms with politically connected debtors are less
likely to require additional restructuring after emerging from bankruptcy. This leads to our
final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: If firms with politically connected debtors provide creditors with implicit
guarantees, then politically connected firms will be less likely to undergo a
subsequent distressed restructuring after emerging from bankruptcy than
firms without politically connected debtors.
In summary, a combination of several factors determines the effect of political connections
in the restructuring process of distressed firms. But it is an empirical question as to which
of these factors (i.e., debtors using their political capital to threaten dissenting creditors, or
the benefits of political connections to firm value) plays the dominant role in the resolution
of distress. The remainder of the paper will focus on answering this question.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Out-of-Court Restructuring
Our main sample is derived from the sample used in Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian (2009).
It consists of firms that file for the Chapter 11 bankruptcy or that reorganize out of court
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from 1991 to 2004. The out-of-court restructuring sample is based on Facitva news search.
In order to be included in the sample, the firm’s creditors must have made a concession in
the restructuring. Additionally, there must be a clear indication of distress (such as default
on debt payments), delisting, or mention of a possible bankruptcy in the news. We also
require that the out-of-court restructuring firms have at least $50 million in total assets (in
1997 dollars) in the fiscal year-end prior to the restructuring. If a firm files for bankruptcy
within 12 months following an out-of-court restructuring, it is only counted as a Chapter
11 case. If a firm has a second out-of-court restructuring within 12 months, it is considered
as a continuation of the first restructuring event and is counted only once. We are able to
identify 149 out-of-court restructurings. However, as we shall describe later, we only include
those cases that have available data to define their political connection status, leaving us
105 out-of-court restructurings.
2.3.2 Chapter 11 Bankruptcies
The Chapter 11 sample is also based on the sample used in Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian
(2009). It is derived from New Generation Research’s Public Major Company Database,
which contains all major public firms that filed for bankruptcy. We restrict the sample
to those firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1991 and 2004 with at least $50 million
pre-filing assets (in 1997 dollars). Bankruptcy characteristics, including the filing date, the
confirmation date and the bankruptcy outcome (namely reorganized, acquired, or emerged)
are determined from BankrutpcyData.com, LexisNexis, Factiva or U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) filings. This approach yields 531 Chapter 11 filings. Again, we
only use 514 cases, where the firm can be defined as either politically connected or uncon-
nected.
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2.3.3 Political Connections
We follow the definition of political connections in Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) and
Faccio and Hsu (2016). Specifically, we search the biographies of each firm’s key personnel
(executives, board members, etc.) in the Capital IQ database for the earlier mentioned 43
key words that indicate a political connection. We require that the connection be in place
when the firm files for bankruptcy or undertakes an out-of-court restructuring. As illustrated
above, a firm should have a clear indication of its political connection status in order to be
included in our sample. We use a dummy variable, PC, to denote firms with politically
connected debtors. We also use an alternate proxy, defined as the total number of political-
connected key personnel, PC Strength, in Capital IQ for a given firm-year as the measure
of the strength of the debtors’ political connections.
In most instances, the Capital IQ database does not contain the dates when the key person
started and ended his/her relationship with the firm. To ensure that a firm is politically
connected at the time of bankruptcy, we manually check the firms’ 10-K files and proxy
statements from the SEC’s website. If we fail to find the person in the financial statements
of the corresponding firm, we search for the person-firm combination on LexisNexis, Proquest,
or Google.com. We are able to identify 289 politically connected persons resulting in a total
of 177 politically connected firms within our combined sample of Chapter 11s and out-of-
court restructurings with complete data. Politically connected firms make up about 29% of
our combined sample.
2.3.4 Firm Level Characteristics
The firm level data are collected from the Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual
File. We use the following dating conventions throughout the paper. We define pre-filing
as the most recent fiscal year end occurring within 12 months of the bankruptcy filing date
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or the out-of-court restructuring date. We also define post-restructuring as the most recent
fiscal year end following the emergence from the bankruptcy procedure or the completion of
the out-of-court restructuring.
2.3.5 Summary Statistics
We are able to identify 514 Chapter 11 bankruptcies and 105 out-of-court restructurings
over the period 1991 to 2004 with pre-filing Compustat data and Capital IQ biographies. As
reported in Table 2.1, the number of Chapter 11s peaks in 2001 following the burst of the
internet bubble, while the majority of the out-of-court restructurings took place in the early
1990s as well as the period following the internet bubble. Table 2.2 reports key pre-filing
firm characteristics for both the Chapter 11 and the out-of-court restructuring in our sample
(detailed variable definitions are summarized in the Appendix). As reported in Table 2.2,
political connections are fairly common among our sample of distressed firms, with about
27% of Chapter 11s and 38% of out-of-court restructurings having politically connected
debtors, respectively. The two political connection proxies merit more discussion. Both the
occurrence (PC) and magnitude (PC Strength) of political connections are higher in the
out-of-court restructuring sample. The differences are significant at the 5% level, indicating
that Chapter 11 firms are less likely to have politically connected debtors compared to those
that restructure out of court. This is our first piece of evidence that political connected
debtors may have an effect on the resolution of distress. The results suggest that debtors’
political capital grants them greater negotiating power leading to higher incidence of out-of-
court restructurings.
Firms that restructure out of court and that file for Chapter 11 appear to have similar
pre-filing leverage, profitability, and secured debts claims. Firms that restructure out of court
tend to have lower Altman’s (1968) z-scores than those that filed for Chapter 11, indicating
that the latter are more distressed. Additionally, firms that restructure out of court have
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more tangible assets, spend more on R&D, and are less likely to be in a distressed industry at
the time of filing compared to their Chapter 11 counterparts. We follow Acharya, Bharath,
and Srinivasan (2007) and define an industry as distressed if the firm’s median industry stock
return is less than 30% in the year prior to the firm filing for Chapter 11 or undertaking
an out-of-court restructuring. The high likelihood of industry distress may indicate that
firms in the Chapter 11 subsample are more susceptible to asset fire sales than those of the
out-of-court subsample (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Additionally, firms that restructure out
of court are less likely to do so during a recession period compared to those that file for
Chapter 11.23 Finally, the summary statistics are broadly consistent with those reported in
Ma and Tashjian (2012), suggesting that our sample is representative of the larger sample
of both Chapter 11 and out-of-court restructuring firms used in their analysis.
In order to provide a clearer picture of the political connections within our sample,
we classify politically connected key personnel into three categories: (i) Executives, which
include all top level executives in the firm such as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Chief
Financial Officers (CFOs), Presidents, and other top executives; (ii) Board Members, which
include any member of the board of directors except those classified as executives above; and
(iii) Others, which include other employees such as divisional presidents and outside advisors.
In Table 2.3, Panel A, we report the percentage of each type of politically connected key
personnel within our sample. As discussed above, there are 289 politically connected people
within our 177 politically connected firms. Among the 289 politically connected people
involved at filing, 139 of them could be classified as politically connected and involved in the
same firm at least five years prior to the restructuring event. This result indicates that firms
tend to become politically connected as they become more distressed. This finding is also
consistent with Adelino and Dinc’s (2014) finding that firms with weaker financial health
increased their lobbying efforts following the financial crisis of 2008.
The endogenous decision of distressed firms to become politically connected affects the
23A recession period is defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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ability to interpret our main results as causal. Specifically, distressed firms could choose to
become politically connected for several reasons that are likely to be correlated with their
ability to successfully reorganize. For example, it is likely that faced with distress, debtors
are willing to pay the cost associated with becoming politically connected if they perceive
that they are more likely to enjoy the long-term benefits of the connections. Thus, observing
a positive relation between politically connected debtors and reorganization may be due to
unobservable firm characteristics that are positively associated with reorganization rather
than the debtors’ political connections. In order to mitigate this possibility, we measure a
debtor’s political connection status five years prior to the onset of distress. We acknowledge
that this may not exclude every possible source of endogeneity, especially if the selection
is based on time invariant factors. However, the ability to predict distress or the need to
restructure is noisy five years out. Thus, we expect the reasons for becoming politically
connected five years prior to the bankruptcy filing or the out-of-court restructuring are less
likely to be correlated with the firm’s ability to successfully reorganize.
As reported in Table 2.3, Panel A, about 9% of the politically connected persons in the
sample are executives, about 80% are board members, and the remaining 11% are other
employees or advisors of the firm. Given that we measure political connections at the time
of bankruptcy filing or at the beginning of an out-of-court restructuring, the high level of
management turnover documented during bankruptcy (Gilson, 1989; Hotchkiss, 1995) may
separate the firm from its political connection prior to the resolution of distress. However, the
majority of our political connections are through non-executive board members who are more
likely to have substantial economic interests in the firm (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997;
Gilson, 1990) and are less likely to be replaced during the bankruptcy or the out-of-court
restructuring. This result gives us confidence that our political connections remain intact
throughout the bankruptcy process. However, this also raises a concern that endogenous
matching of politically connected board members who also possess other skills useful for
distressed firms (i.e., vulture investors (Hotchkiss and Mooriadian, 1997), or turnaround
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experts (Gilson, 1990)) is driving our results. Again, classifying political connections that
exist prior to the onset of distress should mitigate this concern.
In Table 2.3, Panel B, we report the sources of the political connections among our
sample of key personnel. Note that an individual can have more than one keyword matched
in his/her Capital IQ biography. Thus, the percentages reported in the table do not sum to 1.
We consolidate the 43 keywords used to determine political connections into five categories:
(i) Legislative Branch, which includes keywords indicating a connection to the U.S. Senate
or House of Representatives; (ii) Government Agency, which includes keywords indicating a
connection with a government agency such as the Department of Defense or the Department
of the Treasury; (iii) White House, which includes keywords indicating a connection to a
U.S. President or to the White House; (iv) Governor, which includes a connection to a
Governor of one of the states; and (v) Political party, which includes a connection to either
the Democrat or Republican political party. About 70% of the politically connected key
personnel in our sample are connected to the legislative branch, 38% are connected to a
government agency, 35% are connected to the White House, 3% are connected to a governor,
and 3% are connected to a political party. Overall, Table 2.3 suggests that the political
connections in our sample are likely to be of sufficient quality to contribute to the outcomes
discussed in the Section 2.2.
2.3.6 Distressed Firms’ Characteristics
We now examine the pre-filing characteristics of both politically connected and unconnected
firms in the multivariate setting. Table 2.4 reports the results from logistic (tobit) regressions
of PC (PC Strength) on the firm characteristics summarized in Table 2.2. The industry
dummies are based on the Fama-French 12 industries, while the year dummies account for any
time trend in the data. The tobit specification is used in the regressions with PC Strength as
the dependent variable due to its truncation at zero. Table 2.4 presents the regression results
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from the Chapter 11 subsample, the out-of-court restructuring subsample, and the combined
sample. For the Chapter 11 subsample, Log(Total assets) is a significant determinant of
a debtor’s political connection status. The evidence is consistent with prior studies who
also find that firm size is a significant predictor of political connections (Hill et al., 2013;
Faccio, 2010). This result could be purely mechanical, in that larger firms have larger boards
and more employees, and hence more chances for one of them to be politically connected.
On the other hand, larger firms may be more likely to have the resources and economic
incentives to pursue political objectives. Nevertheless, it is important that we control for
firm size in all of our subsequent analyses. Additionally, within the Chapter 11 subsample
we fail to find a significant relationship between a debtor’s political connection status and
several firm level variables that have been shown to be correlated with bankruptcy outcomes
(i.e., reorganization vs. liquidation). This finding assuages concerns that our results in the
upcoming sections that examine the effect of political connections on bankruptcy outcomes
are primarily driven by a debtor’s endogenous decision to become politically connected.
Turning to the out-of-court restructuring subsample, in addition to the positive relation-
ship between politically connected debtors and firm size, there are several other differences
between firms with and without politically connected debtors. Specifically, firms with politi-
cally connected debtors tend to be less profitable, are less likely to be in a distressed industry,
and are less likely to restructure during a recession. Furthermore, politically connected firms
have higher leverage than the unconnected firms, which is interesting as firms with more
leverage are less likely to restructure out of court due to creditor coordination problems
associated with out-of-court restructurings (Gilson, John, and Lang, 1990). Additionally,
the politically connected firms appear to be less distressed with higher Altman’s z-scores.
Overall, among the firms that restructure out of court, the politically connected firms appear
to more closely resemble those that file for Chapter 11. For example, the combination of
greater size and leverage among politically connected firms in the out-of-court restructuring
subsample may suggest that these firms are more likely to have greater creditor coordination
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problems (high H). As shown in Section 2.2.3, a firm with high H is less likely to reorganize
out of court unless the debtors have substantial bargaining power (high P ). The results in
this section suggest that political connections may facilitate out-of-court restructuring by
improving the debtors’ negotiating power.
2.4 Political Connections and Restructuring Venue
As proposed by our Hypothesis 1, firms with politically connected debtors may be more
likely to restructure out of court rather than to reorganize under Chapter 11 because of the
debtors’ greater bargaining power. In this section, we examine the likelihood of firms with
politically connected debtors to reorganize out of court compared to those without.
Table 2.5 reports the results from logistic regressions, where the dependent variable takes
the value of one if the firm reorganized out of court and zero if the firm filed for Chapter
11. All regression models include the control variables in Table 2.4, as well as year and
industry dummies, and t−statistics adjusted for heteroskedastic standard errors. The results
suggest that consistent with our Hypothesis 1, the greater bargaining power of politically
connected debtors under Chapter 11 results in a greater likelihood of politically connected
firms restructuring out of court. The coefficients on all the proxies for political connections
are significantly positive at the 5% level. Specifically, the presence of politically connected
debtors increases the likelihood of an out-of-court restructuring rather than restructuring
under Chapter 11 by approximately 8 percentage points in columns (1) and (3). The presence
of one politically connected debtor increases the likelihood of an out-of-court restructuring
rather than restructuring under Chapter 11 by approximately 3 percentage points in columns
(2) and (4).24 The evidence therefore suggests that the effect of politically connected debtors
on a firm’s choice of restructuring venue is economically significant.
24The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means.
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Furthermore, all four regressions in Table 2.5 show that firms with lower Altman’s z-
score, higher profitability and lower leverage tend to resolve distress via an out-of-court
restructuring. These findings are broadly consistent with those of previous studies and
corroborate our conjecture, based on the evidence in Table 2.4, that the politically connected
firms within the out-of-court subsample are more likely to resemble firms that file for Chapter
11.
In summary, the findings suggest that politically connected debtors have greater bargain-
ing power that offsets the potentially higher holdout costs of firms with politically connected
debtors, thereby resulting in firms with politically connected debtors restructuring out of
court more often than those without.
2.5 Political Connections and Chapter 11
In this section, we examine the role of politically connected debtors within Chapter 11
bankruptcies. Our Hypothesis 2 proposes that when politically connected firms file for
bankruptcy, they are more likely to emerge from the process as going concerns rather than to
liquidate. As discussed, this may be due to the debtors’ improved bargaining power or to the
economic benefits associated with political connections. In order to be consistent with prior
literature, we separate Chapter 11 outcomes into three categories: reorganization, acquisi-
tion, and liquidation (Hotchkiss, 1995). A firm is classified as reorganized if the firm emerges
from the bankruptcy process as a stand-alone company. A firm that sells the majority of its
assets to a single buyer is classified as an acquisition (M&A). A firm that sells the majority
of its assets to multiple buyers is classified as liquidation. Among our sample of Chapter 11
cases, 40% of the cases resulted in a reorganization, 22% resulted in an acquisition, and 38%
resulted in a liquidation. The distribution is broadly consistent with those reported in other
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studies (Lemmon, Ma, Tashjian, 2009).25
Table 2.6 presents the results of multinomial logistic regressions of bankruptcy outcomes
on our measures of politically connected debtors and control variables. Firms with politically
connected debtors are more likely to exit the Chapter 11 process via reorganization compared
to firms without politically connected debtors. The results suggest that the presence of polit-
ically connected debtors increases the likelihood of reorganization versus the other outcomes
(e.g., liquidation or acquisition), and this is more pronounced when one-year-prior-to-filing
measures rather than when the five-year-prior-to-filing measures are employed. Addition-
ally, the presence of politically connected debtors increases the likelihood of reorganization
by approximately 10 percentage points in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7). The presence of one
politically connected debtor also increases likelihood of reorganization by approximately 10
percentage points in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8).26
The evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2 that politically connected debtors use their
bargaining power to force reorganization and/or that politically connected debtors improve
the going-concern values of distressed firms. However, as discussed in Section 2.2, observing
a positive relation between politically connected debtors and reorganization under Chapter
11 is not sufficient to distinguish whether or not politically connected debtors affect the
efficiency of the Chapter 11 process. Therefore, we now turn to examining several post-
bankruptcy outcomes that will indicate whether politically connected debtors are associated
with suboptimal continuation decisions.
25Jiang, Li, and Wang (2012) report that 60% of their firms emerge while 30% are liquidated. How-
ever, their sample only contains large firms with assets greater than $100 million which are more likely to
reorganize.
26We evaluate the marginal probabilities at the sample means.
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2.5.1 Political Connections and Recidivism
As proposed by our Hypothesis 3, debtors exploiting political capital could lead to inefficient
bankruptcy outcomes, and as a result, their firms may be more likely to undergo a subsequent
restructuring event. However, our Hypothesis 4 proposes that if debtors’ political connections
improve firms’ going-concern values, we should observe that firms with politically connected
debtors are less likely to undergo additional restructuring after emerging from bankruptcy.
Recidivism following a Chapter 11 has been studied by several researchers. For example,
Hotchkiss (1995) shows that over 40% of her sample of the firms that emerge from bankruptcy
continue to have a negative operating income three years after the emergence. She further
shows that 32% of her sample undergo a subsequent distressed restructuring within five
years following the emergence from bankruptcy. In addition to high recidivism rates, Gilson
(1997) also shows that firms that emerged from bankruptcy tend to have higher leverage than
their counterparts from the same industry. Typically, researchers have cited this evidence
as a failure of the Chapter 11 process to efficiently reorganize distressed firms. However, as
Kahl (2002) points out, creditors in a distressed restructuring may want to keep distressed
firms on a “short leash” when the uncertainty about the firms’ viability is high, leading to
higher than average leverage in restructured firms. In the context of our study, observing
higher recidivism rates among firms with politically connected debtors that emerge from
bankruptcy may indicate that debtors use their political capital to coerce creditors into
approving suboptimal reorganizations.
Consistent with the prior literature, approximately 30% of our sample of firms undergo
a subsequent distressed restructuring (an out-of-court restructuring or a court-supervised
restructuring) within five years of emergence from Chapter 11. Table 2.7 reports the result
from estimating a Cox-proportional hazard model that examines subsequent failure rates of
firms following their emergence from Chapter 11. We re-measure each of our control variables
using the most recent fiscal year end following the firm’s emergence from bankruptcy. As
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shown in the table, the coefficient on each of our proxies for politically connected debtors
is consistently negative, indicating that firms with politically connected debtors are less
likely to require additional restructuring after emerging from bankruptcy. The effects of PC
and PC Strength on the likelihood of a firm requiring additional restructuring following
emergence from Chapter 11 relative to the baseline hazard function can be obtained by
exponentiating the respective coefficients in Table 2.7. Firms with politically connected
debtors are between 14 and 52 percent less likely to require additional distressed restructuring
following emergence from bankruptcy. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 4 that
the economic benefits from debtors’ political connections result in more successful resolutions
of distress, compared to those of firms without politically connected debtors.
2.5.2 Political Connections and Post-Bankruptcy Capital Structure
The inability of firms to reduce leverage ratios to industry levels via Chapter 11 indicates the
presence of transactions costs that prevent firms from attaining optimal capital structures
(Gilson, 1997; Kahl, 2002). High post-bankruptcy leverage ratios may also contribute to the
observed high recidivism rates among firms emerging from Chapter 11 (See Hotchkiss, 1995;
Altman, Kant, and Rattanaruengyot, 2009). Thus, it is possible that the benefits provided
to creditors of politically connected firms offset such transaction costs, leading to our finding
of lower recidivism rates among firms with politically connected debtors. Therefore, in this
section we examine whether politically connected firms have post-bankruptcy leverage ratios
that are closer to their peers.
We focus on the 121 sample firms that emerged from the Chapter 11 procedure as going
concerns. Among them, 41 firms have politically connected debtors, while the other 80 have
none. In order to determine if our sample firms are able to reduce leverage to normal levels,
we adopt the procedure employed in Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) to construct a
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matched sample firms to use as a benchmark.27 For each firm in our sample, we select a
matching firm that (i) did not undergo a financial restructuring; (ii) is in the same industry
as the sample firm according to the Fama and French 48 industry classifications; (iii) has the
same political connection status; (iv) is of similar size, measured by the book value of total
assets as of the last fiscal year end prior to the bankruptcy filing date; and (v) remains in the
compustat sample for at least three years prior to the sample firm’s bankruptcy filing date
and at least three years after the effective date of the bankruptcy. This final screen ensures
that our matching firm does not experience a major corporate event, such as delisting due
to financial distress, because such firms are more likely to have suboptimal leverage ratios
and are thus inappropriate benchmark firms.
Table 2.8 reports the mean and median financial leverage ratios of our samples of firms
with and without politically connected debtors and those of their respective samples of
matching firms. We calculate financial leverage as the sum of short-term and long-term
debts, scaled by total assets times 100. In each of the three years prior to bankruptcy, both
the mean and median financial leverage ratios of our samples of firms with and without po-
litically connected debtors are significantly higher than those of their matching counterparts.
Following emergence from bankruptcy, the mean and median leverage ratios of our sample of
firms with politically connected debtors are not different from those of its sample of match-
ing firms. However, this is not the case for our sample firms without politically connected
debtors. Following emergence from bankruptcy, both the mean and median leverage ratios
of our sample of firms without politically connected debtors are still significantly greater
than those of its counterpart of matching firms. Furthermore, the difference in differential
leverage ratios between firms with politically connected debtors and their matching coun-
terparts and between firms without politically connected debtors and their matching peers
also suggest that firms with politically connected debtors are more successful at reducing
27In unreported analysis, we find that a large number of politically connected firms are from the telecom
sector, while unconnected firms are more likely to be in the retail industry.
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leverage to optimal levels compared to firms without politically connected debtors.
There are several plausible reasons why firms with politically connected debtors are more
successful at reducing leverage to optimal levels compared to firms without. For example,
creditors may be more willing to grant concessions to firms with politically connected debtors
in order to remain in the good graces of their “political friends.” In this case, one might expect
to observe that creditors of firms with politically connected debtors have lower recovery rates
compared to the recovery rates of creditors in unconnected firms. It is also plausible that
implicit government guarantees granted to firms with politically connected debtors reduce
uncertainty about the firm’s future viability (Kahl, 2002). Hence, we would expect that
the creditors of firms with politically connected debtors are more likely to accept equity in
exchange for their debt claims compared to firms without politically connected debtors. In
order to test these hypotheses, we manually collect data on recovery rates and the amount
of debt exchanged for equity in each of the cases.
In Table 2.9, we summarize what creditors receive during Chapter 11 for both firms
with and without politically connected debtors. The data are hand-collected from the firms’
plans of reorganization and disclosure statements that are confirmed by the bankruptcy
court. These plans are available on BankruptcyData.com, LexisNexis, and in SEC filings. In
Chapter 11, creditors are placed in creditor classes according to the type of creditors’ claim
on the firm. For each firm, we collect the total amount of its bank claims and non-bank
debt claims. For each group of claims, we then record how it is restructured. For example,
creditors in a certain class may receive a package of cash and new securities. We calculate
the recovery rates of each creditor class by scaling the value of the package of cash and
securities received by the total amount of allowed claims for the creditor class. In pricing the
package of cash and securities received, we follow the procedures outlined in Kalay, Singhal,
and Tashjian (2007). Additionally, we determine the proportion of debt claims exchanged
for equity by scaling the market value of equity claims received by the creditor class by the
total amount allowed claims for the creditor class.
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As reported in Table 2.9, creditors in firms with politically connected debtors and cred-
itors in firms without politically connected debtors have similar levels of recovery rates.
The results suggest that the lower post-bankruptcy leverage ratios of firms with politically
connected debtors do not appear to be due to creditors forgiving more debts in these firms
compared to firms without politically connected debtors. However, an average of 34% of cov-
ered bank loans are exchanged for equity in firms with politically connected debtors, while
only 9% of covered bank loans are exchanged for equity in firms without politically connected
debtors. Similarly, on average, firms with politically connected debtors have 66% of covered
non-bank debts converted to equity, while firms without politically connected debtors only
have 48%. At the aggregate level, on average 45% and 32% of covered debts are converted to
equity in the connected and unconnected groups, respectively. The differences are significant
at least at the 10% level for five out of the six mean/median tests that examine differences
in the proportion of equity received. These results suggest that the lower post-bankruptcy
leverage ratios of politically connected firms are partially due to creditors’ willingness to
accept equity in exchange for debt. This evidence is consistent with political connections
providing implicit government guarantees to firms with politically connected debtors that
engender confidence in their future viability.
2.5.3 Political Connections and Post-Bankruptcy Stock Performance
Thus far, we have established that politically connected debtors assist firms in successfully
restructuring their debts in Chapter 11. The majority of the above findings are consistent
with our Hypothesis 4 that political benefits received by creditors outweigh any political
threats from debtors. If this is the case, we might also expect to observe that firms with
politically connected debtors have better post-bankruptcy stock performance than firms
without politically connected debtors.
To implement the test, we extract the CRSP daily returns of the 121 firms that emerge
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from bankruptcy for five years from their effective dates. For those that re-enter the
bankruptcy within the first five years, we keep the returns until the last available date
and adjust for the delisting return. We also drop the returns within the first 30 days from
the effective date to avoid any mispricing due to the initial public offering process.
Table 2.10 reports the excess returns, computed using the calendar-time portfolio method
developed by Fama (1998) for several event windows. The Fama-French 4-factor model is
used as our measure of expected returns. The two groups have significantly different aver-
age excess returns, with the politically connected portfolio outperforming the unconnected
portfolio, for the holding periods of more than one year. The difference is more evident for
equal-weighted portfolios. One concern is that the difference between the two groups may be
largely affected by firms that refile for bankruptcy. In two unreported analyses, we drop the
refiling firms or set the refiling firms’ returns to -100% when the firm refiles. These results are
similar to those reported in Table 2.10. Consistent with the prior sections, the results in this
section also suggest that politically connected debtors facilitate more successful resolutions
of distress.
2.6 Conclusion
We propose and test several hypotheses to examine the impact of politically connected
debtors on the resolution of distress. Overall, our study provides evidence that politically
connected debtors may improve the debtors’ bargaining power, thereby resulting in a higher
incidence of out-of-court restructurings. The results suggest that firms with politically con-
nected debtors are more likely to exit the Chapter 11 process as a going-concern rather than
through acquisition or liquidation. Additionally, we find that firms with politically connected
debtors are less likely to undergo a subsequent distressed restructuring following emergence
from Chapter 11. The findings suggest that the effects of debtors’ political connections on
bankruptcy outcomes are most likely due to the economic benefits associated with political
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connections rather than the potential for debtors to use political capital to coerce creditors
into approving suboptimal continuations of unprofitable firms.
Further, our findings indicate that firms with politically connected debtors are able to
effectively reduce their financial leverage to the industry level after getting out of bankruptcy,
while leverage ratios in firms without politically connected debtors remain above industry
levels. Additionally, creditors of firms with politically connected debtors are more willing
to take equity in exchange for their debt claims. This result is indicative of investors’
greater confidence in the firm’s viability due to implicit guarantees linked to debtors’ political
connections. Overall, our results indicate that firms’ political connections facilitate successful
debt restructurings.
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Table 2.1
Number of Chapter 11 Filings and Out-of-Court Reorganizations by Year
This table summarizes the number of Chapter 11 and out-of-
court cases by year. The sample period is from 1991 to 2004.
N represents the number of cases during the certain year for
the Chapter 11 or the out-of-court restructuring. What’s also re-
ported is the percentage of the number of cases for either Chapter
11 or the out-of-court sample on the total number of the sample
throughout the sample period (%).
Chapter 11 Out-of-Court
Year N % Year N %
1991 12 2.33 1991 4 3.81
1992 6 1.17 1992 7 6.67
1993 12 2.33 1993 9 8.57
1994 11 2.14 1994 4 3.81
1995 14 2.72 1995 4 3.81
1996 23 4.47 1996 2 1.90
1997 24 4.67 1997 1 0.95
1998 29 5.64 1998 4 3.81
1999 48 9.34 1999 4 3.81
2000 71 13.81 2000 4 3.81
2001 107 20.82 2001 13 12.38
2002 77 14.98 2002 21 20.00
2003 50 9.73 2003 18 17.14
2004 30 5.84 2004 10 9.52
All 514 100.00 105 100.00
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Table 2.2
Summary Statistics Across Chapter 11 and Out-of-Court Restructuring
Samples
This table reports summary statistics on key variables. The political connection variables (PC
and PC Strength) are defined based on the firm’s political connection status one year prior to the
time of filing. Other variables are pre-filing characteristics from the most recent fiscal year end
occurring within 12 months of the Chapter 11 filing date or the out-of-court restructuring date.
t represents the p-value of t-test of the two groups’ means. If the variable is binary, the p-value
of the mean difference is reported under χ2. Ranksum reports the p-value of the Wilcoxon test
of the two groups’ medians. The definitions of all variables are described in Appendix Table A.
Chapter 11 Out-of-court p-value
N Mean Median N Mean Median t Ranksum χ2
PC 514 0.27 0.00 105 0.38 0.00 0.02
PC Strength 514 0.43 0.00 105 0.67 0.00 0.02 0.02
Industry distress 514 0.24 0.00 105 0.17 0.00 0.14
Recession 514 0.18 0.00 105 0.10 0.00 0.06
Log(Total assets) 514 2.75 2..36 105 2.74 2.37 0.88 0.37
Profitability 514 -0.01 0.02 105 0.01 0.03 0.30 0.25
Leverage 514 0.94 0.88 105 0.94 0.88 0.99 0.72
Z-score 514 0.48 0.57 105 -0.22 -0.07 0.00 0.00
Tangibility 514 0.35 0.32 105 0.39 0.37 0.05 0.12
R&D 514 0.01 0.00 105 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03
Secured debt 514 0.35 0.23 105 0.34 0.15 0.75 0.48
Prepack 514 0.15 0.00 n/a
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Table 2.3
Summary Statistics on Politically-Connected Positions
This table summarizes the positions of politically connected people and how these people are con-
nected. We identify 289 people as politically connected at the bankruptcy filing; 139 of which are
politically connected at least five years prior to the filing date. Panel A summarizes the positions
of politically connected people across three groups. The executive group includes Chief Executive
Officer, President, Chief Financial Officer, and other top executives. The board members group
includes members of the board of directors who are non-executives. The other employees group in-
cludes other non-executive employees (such as divisional presidents or advisors). Panel B reports
how these people are politically connected. The 47 keywords are divided into five groups: the leg-
islative branch (Senate, Senator, etc.), affiliation with a political party (Democrat, Republican,
etc.), White House (White House, President Obama, etc.), governmental agency (House of
Representative, etc.) and governor of the state. The percentage of keywords is defined as the
total frequency of a certain position group over the total number of people in the group. One
person can be connected with more than one keywords.
Panel A: Positions of Politically Connected People
At Filing Five Years Prior
Position N % N %
Executives 27 9.3 10 7.2
Board Members 229 79.2 115 82.7
Others 33 11.5 14 10.1
Total 289 100.0 139 100.0
Panel B: Political Connection Keywords
Executives Board Other Total
Political Classification Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Legislative Branch 6 22.22 174 75.98 25 75.76 205 70.93
Government Agency 14 51.85 82 35.81 13 39.36 109 37.71
White House 15 55.56 80 34.93 4 12.12 99 34.26
Governor 0 0.00 7 3.06 1 3.03 8 2.77
Political party 0 0.00 8 3.49 2 6.06 10 3.46
Total number of people 27 229 33 289
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Table 2.4
Determinants of Political Connections
This table presents logistic (Tobit) regressions of political connection proxies PC (PC Strength) on
potential determinants. PC or PC Strength is measured a year prior to a Chapter 11 filing or an
out-of-court restructuring. The other variables are pre-filing characteristics of a firm from the most
recent fiscal year end occurring within 12 months of the bankruptcy filing date or the out-of-court
restructuring date. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. t-statistics adjusted for robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
definitions of all variables are described in Appendix.
Chapter 11 Out-of-Court Combined
PC PC Strength PC PC Strength PC PC Strength
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Total assets) 0.545*** 0.661*** 0.211 0.455* 0.497*** 0.636***
(4.722) (5.415) (0.547) (1.684) (4.966) (5.962)
Profitability -1.065 -1.835 -9.807** -1.858 -1.418 -1.624
(-0.881) (-1.392) (-2.429) (-0.519) (-1.323) (-1.328)
Leverage 0.093 0.391 3.693* 1.962* 0.339 0.445
(0.219) (0.780) (1.901) (1.827) (0.897) (0.965)
Z-score -0.029 -0.006 1.756** 0.731* 0.014 0.007
(-0.320) (-0.067) (2.527) (1.879) (0.177) (0.078)
Tangibility -0.766 -1.218 1.466 1.004 -0.423 -0.561
(-1.174) (-1.629) (0.914) (0.860) (-0.744) (-0.870)
R&D -1.134 -0.767 8.672 3.600 2.834 2.808
(-0.211) (-0.132) (0.579) (0.399) (0.659) (0.604)
Secured debt 0.173 -0.017 -1.143 -0.589 0.071 -0.164
(0.515) (-0.047) (-0.922) (-0.709) (0.234) (-0.485)
Industry distress 0.176 0.189 -2.114** -1.742** 0.002 -0.068
(0.623) (0.608) (-2.071) (-2.258) (0.009) (-0.238)
Recession -0.291 -0.083 1.043 0.889 -0.325 -0.012
(-0.517) (-0.145) (0.585) (0.601) (-0.657) (-0.023)
N 514 514 105 105 619 619
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.5
Political Connections and Restructuring Venue
This table reports the results of logistic regressions of a firm’s choice of Chapter
11 or out-of-court restructuring. The dependent variable is a binary variable that
takes the value of one if the firm restructured out-of-court and zero if the firm
filed Chapter 11. PC is a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is po-
litically connected and zero otherwise; PC Strength measures the strength of a
firm’s political connections, defined as the total number of politically-connected
key personnel in Capital IQ for a given firm-year. PC (PC∗) and PC Strength
(PC Strength∗) are measured one year (five years) prior to a Chapter 11 filing or
an out-of-court restructuring date. All control variables are pre-filing characteris-
tics of a firm from the most recent fiscal year end occurring within 12 months prior
to the bankruptcy filing date or the out-of-court restructuring date, and are de-
fined in Appendix. t−statistics, adjusted for robust standard errors, are reported
in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
One Year Prior to Filing Five Years Prior to Filing
Binary Indicator (Out-of-Court=1, Chapter 11=0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PC 0.769***
(2.702)
PC Strength 0.242**
(2.233)
PC∗ 0.746**
(2.267)
PC Strength∗ 0.312**
(2.008)
Log(Total assets) -0.188 -0.185 -0.175 -0.161
(-1.512) (-1.430) (-1.370) (-1.263)
Profitability 4.309*** 4.195*** 4.110*** 4.112***
(3.329) (3.249) (3.168) (3.149)
Leverage -1.194** -1.170** -1.166** -1.181**
(-2.384) (-2.377) (-2.383) (-2.387)
Z-score -0.301*** -0.295*** -0.295*** -0.294***
(-2.969) (-2.951) (-2.909) (-2.925)
Tangibility 0.250 0.258 0.287 0.269
(0.394) (0.404) (0.449) (0.421)
R&D 8.433* 9.116** 8.704** 9.156**
(1.893) (2.035) (1.967) (2.062)
Secured debt -0.055 -0.015 -0.085 -0.013
(-0.158) (-0.043) (-0.244) (-0.036)
Industry distress -0.421 -0.409 -0.430 -0.421
(-1.305) (-1.265) (-1.328) (-1.303)
Recession -0.327 -0.432 -0.337 -0.396
(-0.501) (-0.672) (-0.528) (-0.619)
N 619 619 619 619
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.176 0.178 0.176
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.6
Political Connections and Bankruptcy Outcomes
This table presents the multinomial logistic regressions of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy outcomes
(reorganization, liquidation, or M&A) on a firm’s political connection status. We employ two
measures of the firm’s political connections: (1) A dummy variable, PC , that takes the value of
one if the firm is politically connected and zero otherwise; (2) The strength of a firm’s political
connections, PC Strength, defined as the total number of politically-connected key personnel in
the Capital IQ database for a given firm-year. PC (PC∗) and PC Strength (PC Strength∗)
are measured one year (five years) prior to a Chapter 11 filing or the out-of-court restructuring.
All control variables are pre-filing characteristics of a firm from the most recent fiscal year end
occurring within 12 months of the bankruptcy filing date or the out-of-court restructuring date,
and are defined in Appendix. t−statistics, adjusted for robust standard errors, are reported in
parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
One Year Prior to Filing Five Years Prior to Filing
Reorg vs. Liq Reorg vs. M&A Reorg vs. Liq Reorg vs. M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC 0.387 0.624*
(1.219) (1.851)
PC Strength 0.475*** 0.441**
(2.801) (2.537)
PC∗ 0.248 0.417
(0.661) (1.021)
PC Strength∗ 0.482** 0.338
(2.259) (1.380)
Log(Total assets) 0.524*** 0.465*** 0.476*** 0.440*** 0.541*** 0.507*** 0.500*** 0.493***
(4.269) (3.760) (3.103) (2.859) (4.436) (4.243) (3.275) (3.505)
Profitability 4.511*** 4.875*** 0.399 0.747 4.453*** 4.643*** 0.340 0.484
(3.211) (3.454) (0.260) (0.483) (3.152) (3.251) (0.223) (0.328)
Leverage 1.180** 1.116** 0.657 0.585 1.170** 1.091** 0.622 0.563
(2.307) (2.214) (1.113) (0.985) (2.283) (2.153) (1.042) (1.008)
Z-score -0.142 -0.150 0.085 0.072 -0.147 -0.155 0.074 0.067
(-1.219) (-1.291) (0.651) (0.548) (-1.246) (-1.315) (0.557) (0.544)
Tangibility 1.407** 1.517** 1.055 1.152 1.391** 1.469** 1.007 1.070
(1.994) (2.084) (1.513) (1.629) (1.969) (2.046) (1.432) (1.447)
R&D -1.395 -1.812 -9.008 -9.070 -1.917 -2.543 -9.498 -9.904
(-0.198) (-0.258) (-1.119) (-1.115) (-0.269) (-0.354) (-1.174) (-1.439)
Secured debt -0.378 -0.387 -0.940** -0.931** -0.364 -0.343 -0.923** -0.900**
(-0.970) (-0.991) (-2.356) (-2.326) (-0.937) (-0.876) (-2.318) (-2.210)
Industry distress -0.107 -0.129 0.362 0.343 -0.099 -0.118 0.371 0.350
(-0.347) (-0.414) (1.052) (0.984) (-0.322) (-0.381) (1.082) (0.959)
Recession -1.155* -1.244* -1.331 -1.444* -1.166* -1.178* -1.346 -1.361*
(-1.731) (-1.838) (-1.622) (-1.789) (-1.738) (-1.749) (-1.628) (-1.667)
Prepack 3.566*** 3.515*** 1.672*** 1.653*** 3.549*** 3.536*** 1.629*** 1.627***
(4.424) (4.408) (3.777) (3.739) (4.383) (4.366) (3.736) (3.845)
N 514 514 514 514 514 514 514 514
Pseudo R2 0.251 0.257 0.251 0.257 0.249 0.252 0.249 0.252
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.7
Political Connections and Recidivism
This table presents the Cox-Proportional Hazards models. PC and
PC Strength are measured one year prior to a Chapter 11 filing or an
out-of-court restructuring, whereas PC∗ and PC Strength∗ are mea-
sured five years prior to the Chapter 11 filing or the out-of-court restruc-
turing. The other control variables are obtained from the first fiscal year
end following the firm’s emergence from the Chapter 11 procedure. The
definitions of all variables are defined in Appendix. t-statistics adjusted
for robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical sig-
nificance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
One Year Prior to Filing Five Years Prior to Filing
Log(Hazard Ratio)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PC -0.740
(-1.130)
PC Strength -0.444**
(-2.126)
PC∗ -0.146
(-0.181)
PC Strength∗ -0.660**
(-2.443)
Log(Total assets) -0.161 -0.104 -0.176 -0.129
(-0.495) (-0.336) (-0.570) (-0.421)
Profitability -9.781** -11.030** -10.028** -10.028**
(-2.060) (-2.262) (-1.963) (-2.079)
Leverage 1.413 1.525 1.766 1.670
(0.707) (0.745) (0.867) (0.811)
Z-score 0.108 0.124 0.156 0.114
(0.452) (0.536) (0.602) (0.476)
Tangibility 0.223 0.021 0.564 0.127
(0.227) (0.023) (0.606) (0.135)
Secured debt 0.829 0.766 0.729 0.932
(1.080) (1.047) (0.967) (1.254)
R&D 44.789* 41.144* 45.785** 42.092
(1.918) (1.875) (2.011) (1.593)
AAA-BAA -0.293 -0.325 -0.072 -0.186
(-0.317) (-0.348) (-0.090) (-0.224)
Prepack 0.396 0.309 0.412 0.401
(0.355) (0.295) (0.369) (0.375)
N 113 113 113 113
Pseudo R2 0.259 0.267 0.255 0.266
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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 “Liquidity Demand and the Cross-section of Stock Liquidity”, Job Market Paper 
This paper examines the effect of liquidity demand on the individual stock liquidity. I find that funds tend to hold 
less liquidity than its respective benchmark and that they engage in more liquid stock sales during periods of 
market turmoil. The way that funds manage and utilize liquidity would aggravate the selling pressure of their 
liquid assets and erode their liquidity. Using a measure of forced sale, which accounts for funds' involuntary stock 
selling actions, my results show that stock liquidity decreases as the stock is sold more by distressed mutual funds 
with large negative fund flows. This liquidity deterioration exists mostly among liquid stocks. As a result, liquid 
stocks suffer more especially when the overall market is volatile. My evidence offers an important implication 
that the resulting stock liquidity from trading activities should be stressed in fund liquidity management 
“Political Connections and Debt Restructurings”, with Joseph Halford, and Lilian Ng 
This paper examines the role of political connections in the debt restructurings of financially distressed firms.  
Based on a sample of 619 distressed firms over the period from 1991 to 2004, we find that politically connected 
firms are more likely to reorganize out of court than to undergo Chapter 11 bankruptcy. For corporations that file 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, those with political connections are more likely to reorganize than those without. We 
 102 
 
also show that politically connected firms are less likely to have a subsequent distressed restructuring following 
the first reorganization. In addition, politically connected firms are able to reduce their leverage to their industry 
level, while unconnected firms still remain at a higher-than-industry leverage after the Chapter 11 restructuring. 
Creditors from politically connected firms take more firm equity than those from unconnected firms. Overall, the 
evidence suggests that political connections facilitate successful debt restructurings. 
 
 
